

to defend Taiwan in the event of conflict with the PRC. Instead of boldly moving forward in exploring arms control partnership with China, on the basis of the new opportunities, informing Chinese policy, American policy chose to dwell on the nature of China's "rogue" status as a potential strategic rival.

The 5 November 1999 conference, sponsored by the National Intelligence Council and Federal Research Division, "China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States" reviewed arms control prospects without serious reference to the Chinese white paper emphasis on a "new security concept". The Conference, nevertheless, came to a number of interesting general conclusions. Chinese nuclear doctrine and force structure, for example, was not to be understood in terms of American neo-realist and organizational theories, but in terms of domestic political, technological, historical and cultural factors. The aforementioned theories had apparently failed to predict China's nuclear posture over time, and indeed the Chinese have objected to misinterpretation of their policies, based upon "neo-realism". The Conference acknowledged that the Chinese had for a long time lived with the technological gap between themselves and the US, but that recently they were beginning to close the gap "between real capability, on the one hand, and what one might call 'aspirational doctrine' on the other". Indeed, there is obviously great controversy in the West as to how fast the Chinese might be able to close the technological gap so that they can actually fight a high-tech war.

Chinese international relations and security analysis has stressed that it is not in China's interest to participate in an arms race that would serve as a drag on national economic development and possibly result in domestic political crisis as had happened in the final years of the Soviet Union's competition with the US. Also, one might consider historical Chinese patience in reacting to extraordinary American and Soviet nuclear superiority. The Chinese sought in response a limited nuclear deterrent and did not consider full parity as either feasible or necessary, even in the context of extreme Cold war tension. Contemporary analysis, in fact, still differentiates between "strategic