

operation included UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II which, in turn, had two phases. It can be argued that UNOSOM I collapsed under the weight of bureaucratic infighting and logistical problems. UNITAF, on the other hand, can be judged as a "success" if the evaluative criteria are: securement of a safe environment in which to provide humanitarian relief; demonstrable efforts toward a locally-led political process; removal of heavy weapons from areas of conflict; and the fostering of the restoration of police and government functions. UNOSOM II is the operation most often described as a "failure," in part because the "nation-building" mandate was impossible to achieve and was followed by the necessity to extricate U.N. peacekeepers under the protection of U.S. military forces. The adoption of Security Council Resolution 814 which authorized an ambitious peace enforcement mission extending beyond the famine-afflicted areas set the stage for confusion caused by the pullout of the entire field leadership and many U.S. combat units associated with UNITAF, a collapse of political will, and U.S. combat casualties during a Mogadishu firefight.

Among the questions which might have been posed before UNOSOM II was authorized, and before another such operation is mounted, are these: what would be needed to implement a nation-building mandate? will peacekeepers be exposed to severe risk? will the efforts to extricate the peacekeepers reflect upon the good name and reputation of the United Nations in a seriously negative way? can the U.N. headquarters manage and control military operations? which leading U.N. Member States are willing to "back" the operation and to what extent will they "backstop" the mission during the period of its operation?

The most obvious, yet key question is: what is the purpose of the operation, and can that purpose be articulated clearly enough to gain public support? In the case of Somalia, the public was totally confused: was this a humanitarian mission (which, thanks to televised pictures of starving children, was widely supported), a manhunt for a warlord (which raised the specter of military casualties to a casualty-adverse public), or a nation-building program (which struck many as an overly ambitious task in a remote area of the world). Canada and the United States have both developed sets of evaluative criteria for their participation in peace operations.

Bosnia

By mid-1995, the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) responsible for conducting humanitarian relief and policing local cease-fire agreements, had neither the authority nor the resources to mount an effective defense against the increasingly-brutal Serb attacks on U.N.-declared "safe areas." Some of the lessons of Somalia were incorporated into the commitment of a robust NATO force structure, the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) under NATO command and control to Bosnia following signature on 14 December 1995 of the Dayton Peace Agreement.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ IFOR "transfer of authority" from the United Nations took place on 20 December 1995. IFOR operations are covered under Annex IA of the Agreement, "Military Aspects." The Parties to the Agreement are obligated to welcome IFOR for about one year; they also pledged