national borders) for purposes of nuclear cooperation, even though in theory this principle is not recognized by the government.

In 1976, the Trudeau government adopted an even more restrictive policy. It required that the complete nuclear programme of Canada's customers who had not signed the NPT be subject to IAEA safeguards or their equivalent. This is the policy of "full-scope safeguards."

*Other Restrictions*

As stated above, radioactive isotopes not referred to in the ECL do however appear on an AECB control list. Also, under the United Nations Act, there is at present a ban on exports to Iraq.

## CURRENT DEBATE ON THE CONTROL OF STRATEGIC EXPORTS

*The Future of COCOM Export Criteria*

As members of COCOM, Canada and its allies take many decisions which though technical in nature, in fact concern justice, peace and international order. These decisions are taken against the background of the competing interests of industrialists, Eastern European countries, the developing world and pressure groups.

Western industrialists and the governments of Eastern Europe consider COCOM restraints to be discriminatory measures against them. However, many political leaders and experts advocate the maintenance of restrictive export policies, partly to slow down the Soviet military effort but also to counter weapons proliferation in the Third World.

The Canadian government is therefore caught between the pressures of trade liberalization on the one hand, and the struggle to contain arms proliferation on the other. The multilateral review of the COCOM dual-use products list, which began last year, led to a compromise solution. The list has been retained, but it has been liberalized by authorizing many exports of technology to Eastern European countries. Along these same lines, once amended, Canada's ECL will only restrict exports of very sensitive technology.

The debate on the proliferation of weapons to the developing world has created a new wave of interest in COCOM. Some people have spoken of a "North-South COCOM" to limit the transfer of strategic technology to the Third World, although the Third World is very much opposed to the idea. COCOM, however, was created to deal with the specific case of strategic exports to the East bloc, and would not be well-suited to this new task.

Controls on missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons, as well as possible future restrictions on the transfer of conventional weapons, are more promising non-proliferation measures than is the control of dual-use technology, as exercised by COCOM. This approach also has the advantage of being far more acceptable both to Canadian industry and also to those people wishing to promote technological progress in the developing world and Eastern Europe.

*Nuclear Exports*

Canada's policy on nuclear exports is accepted by the vast majority of the population. However, there has been debate recently on a few aspects of Canadian nuclear trade. Even though Canada does not export critical nuclear materials for use in weapons programmes, it is feared that some Canadian products may serve directly or indirectly in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

First, there is the issue of tritium. This extremely rare gas, which is produced through nuclear fission, is made in Canada and will soon be exported for various industrial uses. Tritium is also used to enhance the power of nuclear explosions. The sale of tritium abroad requires an AECB permit. However, the gas is not subject to IAEA international safeguards, and many people fear that it may be used for unauthorized purposes. For this reason, in 1986 the Canadian government published guidelines on tritium, specifying the criteria to be applied when verifying that it is used for peaceful purposes. Canada has encouraged other tritium suppliers to apply such standards. Canada's proposal to this effect was supported at the last NPT review conference, and it is expected that transfers of tritium will soon be subject to international rules.

There has also been criticism of Canadian exports of depleted uranium. Depleted uranium is a by-product of the manufacture of enriched uranium. It is used in hydrogen bomb casings and in the production of plutonium. Depleted uranium is not produced in Canada but is purchased from the United States and further processed in Canada into industrial products. The metal processed in Canada and exported back to the United States is not covered by the Canadian "non-fungibility" rule. This rule provides that only the exported Canadian nuclear materials, and not the equivalent quantity in the stockpile of the customer, is subject to guarantees of non-explosive use. Because the rule is not applied to depleted uranium, there is no guarantee that depleted uranium of Canadian manufacture is not being used in the US nuclear arsenal. However, Canadian government officials and