

chemical munitions is limited by such factors as the stability of chemical agents during storage or the extent to which they attack the materials of which, in particular, the munition casing or other storage structures and facilities are composed, it does not seem that those factors will be of such fundamental importance in the case of binary weapons. This will allow the creation of mixtures with the widest imaginable range of effects.

2. It will become possible for many States, and not only States but also individual groups of persons, to produce, acquire and stockpile chemicals for new types of binary weapon. This means that there would be a significant increase in the danger of the proliferation of chemical weapons.

3. The positive results of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, both in the Committee on Disarmament and between the USSR and the United States of America will lose much of their value, in particular:

(a) Agreement was reached during the Soviet-United States negotiations on a provision concerning the scope of prohibition, reproduced in the joint Soviet-United States report to the Committee on Disarmament (CD/112 of 7 July 1980). This provision envisages the prohibition of all types of toxic lethal chemicals, including, of course, binary ones. The report speaks of the obligation "... never to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain super-toxic lethal, other lethal or other harmful chemicals, or precursors of such chemicals", and the obligation "never to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of chemicals released as a result of the employment of these munitions or devices, or equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices". These wordings thus include corresponding prohibitions in respect of binary weapons. The programme of production of binary weapons now envisaged in the United States may cancel out these positive results.

(b) The significance and effectiveness of the toxicity criteria of lethal chemicals agreed upon between the USSR and the United States (CD/112 of 7 July 1980) will be reduced.

4. The further progress of negotiations will face serious difficulties, in particular for the following reasons:

(a) It will be more difficult to ensure the implementation by States parties of obligations not to transfer the chemical weapons and other obligations related thereto, because separating chemicals for commercial purposes from those designed for weapons will become especially difficult, almost impossible;