may ask the Committee of Experts for information and assistance in ascertaining the facts. Procedures for on-site inspection consented to by states, including the details of rights and functions of inspecting personnel and the role of the party being inspected, would be elaborated in the treaty.

A state suspecting a violation of treaty obligations may lodge a complaint (with accompanying relevant information and possible evidence) with the Security Council. The Security Council may conduct an investigation and would report the results. Parties would undertake to assist any party which requests help if the Security Council deems that the party has been exposed to danger because of a treaty violation by another party.

5. Selected Comments of States:

Some states such as Sweden and Belgium (CD/PV.182, 26 August 1982) support an international verification system for a CTBT including an exchange of seismic data and atmospheric monitoring. Other states such as Czechoslovakia (CD/PV.182, 26 August 1982) emphasize the need for national verification measures. Czechoslovakia (CD/PV.205, 22 March 1983) supports the Soviet proposal that information collected by national technical means should be made available to all parties, especially those which do not possess national technical means of verification. Bulgaria (CD/PV. 199, 1 March 1983) supports a combination of national and international means of verification.

Australia (CD/PV.209, 5 April 1983) poses a number of questions about the Soviet "Basic provisions" related to the mandate of the Committee of Experts (seismic verification only or atmospheric detection?), the complaints procedure, the authority to organize on-site inspections (who possesses it?) and the role of the Security Council or other UN bodies including the Committee on Disarmament in the process.

A debate also exists over the question of whether current verification technology is adequate to detect and identify seismic events for a CTBT. Japan (CD/PV.259, 17 April 1984) comments that not all underground explosions may be detected and identified so the verification system has to be upgraded with advances in seismology and the incorporation of a number of so-called "black boxes". The US (CD/PV.296, 5 March 1985) believes that existing technical means of verification are not sufficient for monitoring a CTBT. Belgium (CD/PV.301, 21 March 1985) states that information suggests that a nuclear explosion can be camouflaged so that it appears as earthquake activity, therefore scientific and technical work must continue. The FRG (CD/PV.307, 11 April 1985) says that there are outstanding problems connected with distinguishing nuclear explosions from other seismic events. Many other countries, however, suggest that current verification technology is adequate. The USSR, for example, (CD/PV.283, 21 August 1984) states that authoritative experts have