

tions are essentially meaningless in the absence of very good political relations between states – is more convincing. The fact that the Western states genuinely question the merit of Declaratory Measures as CBMs and, frequently, suspect (whether correctly or not) ulterior motives for the floating of declaratory proposals effectively dooms those measures as genuine Confidence-Building Measures. Such grave doubts *undermine any possible confidence, predictability, reduced uncertainty or any other positive CBM outcome.*

One interesting but rarely discussed “solution” to the intrinsic “credibility problem” of Declaratory CBMs entails the linking of Constraint Measures with Declaratory Measures under a larger, blanket agreement. Here, a “no first use of force” declaration *in combination with* typical Constraint Measures, designed to constrain particularly offensive equipment and manpower capabilities and deployments, as well as thorough Notification Measures *could* serve a constructive and genuinely Confidence-Building purpose.

In principle, there may be no harm in including these sorts of Declaratory Measures in a broad discussion of Confidence-Building Measures but I think that their further consideration in this study is out of place – primarily because (1) they have (and can have) no directly observable impact on capabilities; (2) their faithful execution is immune to meaningful confirmation (intrinsic in their frequently “non-use” character); and (3) they fail to engender anything like confidence on the part of many principal states. This past point is sufficient to seriously discredit the status of Declaratory Measures as CBMs.

### Conclusion

The sheer volume of Confidence-Building-Measure proposals defeats any effort to provide a concluding evaluation of individual strengths and weaknesses. The proposals have been discussed critically throughout this chapter and several more general and extensive points regarding certain types of proposals will be pursued at greater length in the next chapter. At this point, it might be convenient to summarize the CBM categories and include some typical illustrations.

## Information and Communication CBMs

### Information Measures

- publish technical information on force composition
- publish and discuss defence industry data
- publish regularized data on defence budgets
- publish arms control impact studies
- conduct “seminars on strategy”
- establish a “Standing Consultative Commission” to deal with questions of treaty compliance
- conduct military personnel exchanges

### Communications Measures

- establish, extend and refine “Hot Lines”
- establish “Joint Crisis Control Centres”

### Notification Measures

- notification of single manoeuvres involving personnel levels exceeding set floors of (variously) 25,000, 20,000, 18,000, 15,000, or 10,000 men
- notification of military manoeuvres (variously) 21, 30, 40 or 60 days prior to commencement
- inclusion of detailed information about personnel and equipment to be used during manoeuvres in the notification (unit composition, exercise purpose, location of exercise)
- notification of “aggregate manoeuvres” involving smaller manoeuvres conducted concurrently or in close succession (aggregate totals of from 10,000 to 25,000)
- notification of naval manoeuvres conducted within a specified distance of (for instance) the European landmass involving specified types and/or numbers of naval vessels and personnel
- notification of air force manoeuvres involving types and/or numbers of aircraft beyond specified limits
- notification of military “movements” and “out-of-garrison” activities involving personnel and equipment beyond a specified level and/or in specified (sensitive) regions
- inclusion of detailed information about the nature, composition, direction, duration and location of military movements and other “out-of-garrison” activities

