

My final point is that I tend to see the US position not as one of isolationism but one tending towards global unilateralism. I think that is the danger, and our dialogue with the USA and the dialogue of the Europeans with USA can help Canada contain it.

The last point I would make is that in talking to the Canadian peace movements I ask one thing of them always, to try and be even handed without being neutralist if they want to have any impact on anybody. If they're not even handed, it just sounds slanted, prejudiced and counterproductive.

Eugene Rostow: Would it help if I said one sentence about the British and French weapons systems and their roles?

It's come up and I sympathise with those who don't want to be unfair, beastly to the Soviets although they speak of the British and French systems with open contempt and treat it entirely as a ploy. But you should all know that in the minds of the American negotiating team, while our political position is and must remain, because of the positions of the British and French governments at least for this round, absolutely implacable and clear, know perfectly well, that in Salt I and Salt II, we took the British and French systems into account and, as Paul Nitze has said "Of course we take them into account, we paid for them five times and this time we'll only pay once God Dammit!"

John Holmes: Thank you, I appreciate that. I just would like to get on the record something I would have liked to have discussed and that is the question of economic sanctions, which is a very important aspect of security and we haven't touched on it at all. And you're faced with this paradox. The Charter suggests of course that one goes to economic sanctions, first in Chapter 6 before you go on to Chapter 7. Whatever the Charter says, it's the normal thing to think. When the Soviet Union does what it did in Afghanistan you have to do something, you can't sit back and say it doesn't really