

way desires. It may be too soon to decide exactly in what direction reform is needed. The consideration of this question must be left, for the present, to the council of judges which has taken it up. The public will await with anxious expectancy the result of their deliberations; the one point which is already quite clear and unmistakable being the need of some reform which will put a stop to the intolerable expense and delay involved in a trial in the High Court, and which will satisfy the commercial world that they are likely to have their differences adjusted promptly and satisfactorily. As things are now, there is a certain mystery hanging over the direction in which commercial 'business' has fled. Are disputes taken before arbitrators, or are they patched up privately in solicitors' offices, or are they settled by the even more questionable device of the toss of a coin? Each explanation is probably partly correct, and it is a grave reflection on our judicial system that shrewd men of the world should show such a profound disinclination to visit the oracles of the Royal Courts and listen to the very expensive responses there obtainable. What must be insisted upon is the broad and simple fact that the Judicature Acts, which were intended to simplify and cheapen the administration of justice, have failed in attaining their object. It surely is not beyond human ingenuity to discover where the fault lies, and to apply the fitting remedy. It is said by lawyers that a lawsuit must always be an expensive affair when scores of precedents have to be hunted up and compared together before a decision can be reached. The intricacy of the law and the multiplication of reported cases necessitate the trained expert; and the employment of trained experts always costs money. As far as this plea is a valid one, it is an argument in favor of speedy codification of the law. Yet, even supposing that the unearthing of the one decision which settles any particular dispute must be a matter for skilled inquiry, there is no reason why the natural costliness of the system should be enhanced by artificial devices and obstacles of all kinds. A council of judges cannot be more usefully employed than in pointing out to legislators exactly the cause of all existing deficiencies in the legal machinery; but whether as a result of the efforts of the bench or of the growing discontent of the public, it is certain that before long the whole question of law reform will become one with which Parliament will be called upon to deal."

POWER TO EXTEND TIME AFTER STATUTORY LIMIT EXPIRED.

R.S.O. C. 124, S. 20, S-S. 5, 1887, AND SIMILAR SECTIONS.

Where power is given to a judge to do certain acts, the question often arises as to the extent of his power, and whether or not he may exercise a discretion beyond the letter of the law conferring the power on him. The object of the writer is to deal with this question, taking for the immediate subject of discussion s-s. 5, s. 20, c. 124, R.S.O. The principles contended for are of considerable importance, as there are many cases more or less governed by their application. The law affecting the question is very different to that which is applicable to cases arising under the Judicature Act. The court is allowed, under that Act,