

tion, the sole originator of ideas, the sole medium and test of truth. All ideas have their origin in the activity of the senses, and the mechanism of association explains the structure of knowledge built on this foundation.

Turn now from the Empirical beginnings of Modern Philosophy to the Rationalistic. While Bacon gave his attention to the analysis of nature, Descartes, who aimed at grounding all human knowledge upon its ultimate principles, laid emphasis on the analysis of thought. Confining his attention to the mind itself as the instrument and medium by which all truth is perceived, he gave a new impetus to the Rationalistic method of philosophizing, and thus laid the basis of the modern Idealism. Descartes divides ideas, according to their origin, into three classes—adventitious, factitious, and innate. Adventitious are those which, happening to be observed, come from without. They imply a kind of reality. Factitious are constructed from within, by the imagination, and hence are due to the activity of thought. They may or may not possess certainty. Innate ideas, as contrasted to the two former, are such as are "perceived clearly and distinctly by the light of nature." They are necessarily true, their criterion being immediate evidence or certainty. Chief among these innate ideas are the idea of self and the idea of God.

Locke, the first to attempt a systematic development of philosophy on an Empirical basis, disputed the existence of ideas in the understanding from birth. He attacked the theory of innateness and self-evidence. The so-called innate ideas are neither universally known nor acknowledged. They are not self-evident, since men do not give an immediate assent to such general propositions. They know particular facts first, and only assent to the general after some investigation. It will be noticed here that Locke attacked "innate ideas" as formulated abstract propositions in the mind before experience, a conception which is a pure creation of Locke's own mind, never having

been held as a theory by any school.

In Locke's positive reply to the question of the origin of knowledge, he likened the mind at birth to a sheet of white paper, on which experience is to write, or as a dark chamber into which experience is to let the light. This light comes in the form of simple ideas, the two sources of which are sensation and reflection, outer and inner experience. Ideas received through sensation are emanations from external objects, and are received into the mind through the medium of the senses. The perception by the mind of these ideas thus received, and of its own action in dealing with them, is reflection. These two avenues are the sources of all knowledge. Sensation is the occasion and the presupposition for reflection. From the simple ideas received through these two senses the mind builds up the whole complex of knowledge.

The relative value of sensation and reflection in Locke's Theory of Knowledge has been the pivotal point on which have turned the many contradictory theories of his followers. Locke left the relation of the mental activity to its original sensuous content so indefinitely stated, that it has given occasion to the many and diverse systems which have purported to be the logical development of his theory. According to the varying degree of self-activity which was ascribed to the mind in the process of connecting ideas, have arisen the various views which have sprung out of a consideration of Locke's philosophy. The Idealism of Berkeley, the Scepticism of Hume, the Materialism of Hartley and Condillac are all correct consequences of Locke's principle, accordingly as one side or another of that principle is emphasized.

Berkeley departed from Locke in holding that the latter was not justified in inferring from the ideas received through sensation the existence of an external world as the cause of those ideas. Our sensation, says Berkeley, are entirely subjective. We are wholly in error if we believe that we have a sensation of external objects, or perceive them. That which we have