

would be difficult to say of what use they could be without the means of moving them. The whole affair broke down in its equipment immediately on reaching its destination. Part of the horses were turned to account in enabling one of the 6-pounder troops or horse artillery to exchange its very light guns for 9-pounders; and the remainder were given over to a reserve company of artillery at Varna, and a battery formed with them and other horses purchased at Tunis. The guns were sent out from England, and the additional men required were obtained from Malta. Crude and ill-constructed as the batteries from England were, this last one, formed as it may be said, in the presence of the enemy, was necessarily still more so. Many of the horses were but half trained to draught. The English harness was unsuited to the native horses. A considerable number of the men were only finally posted to the battery on the very eve of its embarkation for the Crimea; and all those fresh from the garrison of Malta knew little or nothing of field batteries or the duties connected with them. No one looked on the state of things as anything extraordinary. The English definition of a field battery was a certain number of guns, horses and men, and there they were; but whether the horses would draw in harness, or whether the men knew anything of the duties they were called upon to perform, or had ever been in the way of obtaining the slightest instruction in them, seemed matters of no consideration. To make mention of them amounted to "creating difficulties,"—a favourite expression against any officer bold enough to question the wisdom of routine at the seat of war. It was only necessary to make the best appearance, give no trouble, and everything was taken, as a matter of course, as in the best possible order. The regimental officers complained among themselves, but they worked hard; and it is due to them, and to the zeal of the non-commissioned officers and men, that difficulties were in a great degree overcome, and much credit fairly and honorably obtained.

The nature of the war, which, after a few days marching, brought the army to a fixed encampment, from whence it never moved, left our artillery, and our army generally untried in some of its weakest points. Nor were the battles fought exactly those to test the efficiency of the artillery by, or to give a knowledge of the effects of a well-directed use of the arm.

Our generalship, which is simply go on to the infantry, ignores the artillery altogether. At Alma, without any knowledge of the nature of the attack, or the points of the enemy's position to be assailed, they were left to wander over the field in single batteries, and to act in an isolated manner as individual officers might judge best. At Inkermann the confined nature of the position, and its limited front, necessarily massed them—there was no room to misuse them; the consequence was recorded in Menschikoff's despatch.

The strength of the artillery with the British army at or soon after the landing in the Crimea, consisted of 8 field batteries and two troops of horse artillery, or 60 guns.—This was the whole force of the arm, and there was no available reserve of any kind at home or abroad. Some guns of position were embarked with the army, but as they had no horses to move them, they might up to the occupation of the permanent position before Sebastopol, just as well have been in England. These 8 batteries and 2 troops were posted to divisions as follows:—

Cavalry Division	1 6-pounder troop.
Light Division	1 9-pounder troop.
	and 9-pi. battery.
1st do.	2 9-pounder bat.
2nd do.	2 9-pounder do.
3rd do.	2 9-pounder do.
4th do.	1 9-pounder do.

Of this small force—the art of the arm in England—the men generally knew little or nothing of field duties, or of the practical service of the guns they were called upon to work with. Few or none of them, or of the non-commissioned officers either, had ever seen a shot or a shell fired from them even at practice. They were ignorant of the different natures of ammunition carried with them and of the circumstances or ranges under which each could be used with the greatest effect. The mass of them had never fixed a loss in their fires, white, to perplex those who had, a new and improved fuse, totally different in its manipulation from the old one, was partly issued at the moment. A mixed description of tube for firing the guns was also sent, part being friction tubes to which the men were unaccustomed, and part being of the old pattern requiring a lighted fuse to ignite them. Some captains tried in vain to be allowed practice, for which the ground about Varna was very favorable. Their request was refused. The troops of horse artillery, shrewd in drill and so magnificent to look at, were not, as gunners, one whit better than the field batteries. In all the essential duties of artilleryists, in the practical use of their guns, and the knowledge of the ammunition carried with them, they were just as deficient as the rest of the service. Their opportunities for practice had been quite as little cared for; and in that essential part of every artilleryman's education, the repository course, they were as a body altogether wanting. They could beat the cavalry in a race—they could gallop past to admiration—they could wisk here and there, turn in and out—come into action and fire an incredible number of blank cartridge in an incredibly short space of time, all in the most theatrical and delightful manner; and these were the sole qualifications on which their reputation as the most "splendid artillery in the world" rested. At every review the field batteries, after marching past on foot, were sent home as not fit to be seen any further; and the arena was cleared for fantastic displays, with which the public were blinded into the belief that the money voted was well spent, and that our field artillery, at all events, was perfect.

It was entirely in the hands of officers of horse artillery that the regiment fell from a fair amount of instruction in some of its most important duties to its condition at the present moment, and at the commencement of the late war. Two horse artillery officers in succession commanded the artillery in the Crimea; and out of six field officers present just before Inkermann, three were of that arm, although there were only two troops of horse artillery present with the army. Two horse artillery field officers commanded the artillery attached to two divisions of infantry, and, as if it was our effort always to endeavor to get the men most likely to be unsuitable for the required duties, an officer who had always pided himself in his whole service having been passed in the horse artillery, actually for six months commanded and had charge of the siege train. It may be that this conduct of affairs has something to do in our shortcomings in military matters. The profession is not made a study, because no one feels that making it a study is of the slightest

consequence.

The instruction of artillerymen should be incessant and persevering; and a case of every part of our field artillery should be capable of working every description of ordnance, and have a knowledge of too mechanical means of mounting them and moving them into position, over obstacles, and through every nature of ground. The mere duties of a field gun should never absorb the whole time of an artilleryman. He should be ready to discharge his duties with any nature of gun, and he can never know too much or be too handy. He is but half an artilleryman unless he is made responsible for the position of his batteries at all times, and for the construction and aiming them. Charged with such duties, he will take care that his guns are well placed to effect the object required, that they are not enfiladed by the fire of the enemy, or feebly covered from direct shot by weak and ill-constructed parapets. He will see that his embankments admit of seeing the object aimed at, and that his platoons are properly laid. He has the charge of lighting his batteries, he should also have the privilege—the right—to make them. Who else can be so interested in an art that relates to them? He will be sure to seek, for the means are all in his hands, and all the honor attached to it will be his, to inflict the greatest amount of damage upon the enemy at the smallest loss to himself.

There is no speciality in the service of field, garrison, or horse artillery; and nothing to justify a marked distinction in dress or pay, or organization of the arm, more especially in a country like England, with no home fortresses, and having a widely-extended colonial empire. It is of the greatest advantage, not merely in an economical point of view, to have companies of artillery in every part of the world fit to take over a field battery as well as to serve garrison ordnance; and the more uniform our artillery is in its organization, the more efficient it will become. There is nothing at all incompatible with efficiency in the combination of instruction in everything relating to every description of ordnance, nor should there be the slightest difficulty in carrying it out. A hearty recognition of the principle, and placing it in proper hands to work it, together with a fair and impartial administration of the patronage of the regiment, would soon give new life, and energy, and emulation to the service. If a sailor can work his ship and fight his guns, the artilleryman will not suffer in intelligence in learning something beyond the routine of a six or a nine-pounder. Some advance was made in this respect under the auspices of the Duke of Wellington and Sir A. Dickson in the system of uniting the duties of the gunner and driver; and the testimony of officers of such eminence and great practical experience should weigh far more in its favour than that of any officer of the present day against it. As there seems a disposition directly or indirectly, by fair means or foul, to set this system aside—to keep a number of short men to be handed about from one company to another, uncared for by officers who have no permanent charge of them, and who will soon become demoralised, it would be well disparagingly to consider the evidence given by the late Lord Vivian, when master-general of the ordnance, and by the late Sir A. Dickson, when Adjutant-General, before the military commission in 1838-39, as well as the present General Campbell's evidence on a later occasion, relative to the efficiency which the batteries in Canada under his command had attained to.