

rather than months". It must be asked why it should be more effective or hasten events more than the ineffective terrorist attacks that preceded it.

Rhodesia has a much longer periphery to guard, now that both Mozambique and Zambia allow guerrillas to cross at any point. It has lost the South African paramilitary police, but has replaced them with a third black battalion, longer call-ups and some recruitment of mercenaries into its regulars. It has better arms (especially helicopters), better training, and a fund of anti-guerrilla experience. The question is whether the attacks can be so effective and so dispersed that this force will have to be increased to the point where there are too few whites to carry on production and other essential work. At that stage, the economy would run down and the guerrilla's first aim would be achieved. Their second aim is to demonstrate to the mass of Rhodesian Africans that the whites cannot win, and so start an upsurge of disobedience and sabotage, which has not yet eventuated because Rhodesian security and intelligence are so effective.

In assessing the guerrillas, it should be emphasized that these are their objectives; an all-out, set victory is not necessary. Kaunda, in fact, hopes that, when the Rhodesians are convinced that they cannot themselves win, even if they can indefinitely repulse guerrilla incursions, Smith will be repudiated. Then negotiations under some other leader and party can be resumed, leading to a majority government with white participation and not too much bitterness — above all, without the destruction of Rhodesia's economy, or the development of a completely Marxist guerrilla movement.

Guerrilla weakness

On their side, the guerrillas are weak and, indeed, divided. They are receiving modern weapons and Chinese and Cuban instructors (who often help them technically but discreetly in operations). Their camps, however, are in countries with weak economies and infrastructures — particularly Mozambique. More important are their political divisions. Muzorewa's African National Council was a stop-gap organization created for the Pearce Commission; it was the umbrella under which the rival ZAPU and ZANU parties were to present the Smith Government with a united front after the release of their respective leaders, Nkomo and Sithole. The ANC never did so, though the name lingers. Muzorewa, after being drawn to the militant wing (mainly ZANU), has gone into despairing

exile. Smith helped to split the ANC front by refusing to allow the ZAPU leaders accused of terrorist crimes back into Rhodesia. The militant wing, opposed to both Nkomo and to Kaunda's policies, and claiming to lead all the freedom fighters in operation, continued to demand all-out war and immediate black rule for "Zimbabwe".

But the murder of Mr. Herbert Chitepo, ZANU's leader in Zambia, showed that the militant wing was split, and the revelations that have followed Zambian police investigations indicate that tribal and personal animosities, self-seeking and corruption, produced an internal feud costing hundreds of lives. No leadership of "Zimbabwe" survives, only a clamour of discordant voices. To Kaunda, the danger from this is the repetition of an Angolan situation in Rhodesia. To the Marxists, the "correct" answer is their own predominance. Both expect that, during the exile of political leadership like Mondlane's, military leadership will arise in the field. There are many difficulties in this proposition. The "cadres" are supposedly led by mixed teams of ZANU and ZAPU officers, who often quarrel. These divisions prevent unified guerrilla leadership or tactical planning; they remain capable only of raiding, intimidation and sporadic atrocities. Their best efforts to date have been the brief interruption of Rhodesia's two vital railways. Until they do consistently better, there will be no internal rising in Rhodesia, and no response in South Africa's fever-ridden shanty-towns.

The pace of the struggle would be galvanized, of course, by a new intervention. Fidel Castro has disclaimed any such crusading intention and agreed to withdraw his troops from Angola. But the withdrawal (presumably at the behest of Russia, worried about the attacks on *détente* during the American Presidential election) is gradual, and already there are up to 1,000 Cuban technicians in Mozambique replacing the evicted Portuguese. Intervention cannot yet be ruled out, despite Dr. Kissinger's strong words in Lusaka. The Zimbabwe leaders — and the SWAPO command in Angola — certainly consider that they should be able to call on "brotherly aid" from fellow revolutionaries in certain circumstances — by which they actually mean the unfair ability of the Rhodesians to hold out. Rhodesian indulgence in hot pursuit of retaliation against Zambia or Mozambique would also be invoked as a reason for calling in Cuban troops, whose efficacy in

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