

5. Narasimhan said that although he preferred the above solution, he was sure the Secretary-General would welcome our views on the alternative solution of a strong United Nations coordinating group, under whose direction the military missions would train the Congolese forces. If such a group had a balanced composition, and the African-Asian states could be persuaded to accept this solution, it would, of course, ease the Secretary-General's position.

...

19.

DEA/6386-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Permanent Representative to United Nations*

TELEGRAM ME-100

Ottawa, April 15, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL. OPIMMEDIATE.

Reference: Your Tel 481 Apr 11.†

Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Brussels, CCOS (Routine).

By Bag Cairo, Delhi, Leopoldville, Accra, Lagos, Stockholm, Oslo.

CONGO: ANC TRAINING

We agree that in Congo Advisory Committee you should take whatever line is likely to be of most help to the Secretary-General in overcoming a difficult situation. Thus if U Thant recommends at beginning of meeting exclusively bilateral arrangements for training ANC you may accept his recommendation. If U Thant does not express any views and asks for advice of members you should emphasize relationship of withdrawal of ONUC to training programme and say we would prefer UN to coordinate the programme but if this is not feasible then Congolese should be allowed to make their own arrangements bilaterally.

2. For your own information we should not lose sight of fact that how this question is settled may have an important effect on future domestic political situation in Congo. Purely bilateral arrangements with Belgians will lay Adoula Government open to opposition charges they have taken Congo into Western camp. Presumably this possibility has not escaped Soviet Union as well as Casablanca powers and other non-aligned states who may find Adoula and present leadership in Leopoldville too pro West. It is important therefore UN reaction to whatever solution is found should not be such that it can be interpreted later as tacit disapproval or objection to bilateral arrangements.

3. We agree with your assessment of the feasibility of the Ghana compromise proposal (your paragraph 6) but think we should not take a public position on the question of African states training the ANC.