abilities, but yet be unable effectually to exert them in the instruction of his pupils. This might be great evil to an institution of this nature, and yet it might not amount to a cause which in a court of justice would justify the dismissal of the master. At the same time it must be admitted that the circumstances I have mentioned would form a good ground for

desiring the master's dismissal."

It is needless to enlarge this list of actual, though not perhaps legal disqualifications. An unstained moral character, high intellectual attainments, and unsparing activity in the discharge of duty, may, and often do, co-exist with unhappy forms of temper, restless irritability and morbid sensitiveness, or jealousy, which may utterly unfit their possessor for the useful discharge of the delicate duties of education, and the creation of respect and confidence amongst fellow-workers and pupils.

The court anxiously avoided all intermeddling with the merits or demerits of individuals in the unfortunate disputes

that have resulted in this litigation.

It is sufficient to say that, wherever the blame rested, a state of things was disclosed most injurious to the best interests

of Queen's College.

We are anxious to carry out the benevolent directions of the last section of the royal charter, which enjoins on courts of justice that its language "shall be construed and adjudged in the most favourable and beneficent sense for the best advantage of our said college."

I have bestowed much consideration on the argument of plaintiff as to his legal right as professor, and have at last (although not without some doubt), arrived at the conclusion that he was removable by the trustees, at a meeting where the statutable number of members was present, although not

for cause under the 15th section.

I think the appeal must be allowed—that the plaintiff's bill in the court below should be dismissed. I think the case against him, as to the want of jurisdiction in the court below, is reasonably clear; that his interest in his office is not such as he claims; and lastly, that the case disclosed is one in which neither a court of equity nor law should interfere, except on the very clearest and most conclusive pressure of authority and precedent.

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