Smaller countries and middle countries like Canada, in any normal circumstances, would not have the effective ground forces for use in collective security situations such as that which has developed in Korea.

Furthermore, before June of this year, it was reasonable, I suggest, for all members of the United Nations, and for the smaller countries in particular, to assume that the chances were fairly small that they would be called upon by the United Nations to contribute to collective military action against aggression occurring many thousands of miles away. The articles of the Charter which had been specifically designed to provide for military sanctions had remained inoperative, and even now have not been invoked. The Russian use of the veto also seemed to make it impossible for the Security Council to invoke military sanctions against any communist aggression. What happened in June in the Security Council because of the rather fortuitous absence of the U.S.S.R., and because of the initiative and leadership of the United States of America, changed the whole character of the United Nations, at least for the time being, and changed it for the better.

It would not, however, have been realistic, I think, nor would it have been wise, for any government to have based its military planning on the assumption that such a change would take place or that the United Nations would be able to act as it did.

The North Atlantic Treaty, in fact, had been concluded in 1949 in order to fill, at least in the North Atlantic area, that particular gap in the Charter created by the impotence up to that time of the Security Council to enforce collective security. So our obligations for collective defence in that North Atlantic area became specific, and there was no Soviet Russia to obstruct and frustrate action under them. We knew what was involved in that obligation, but we did not, nor indeed did any country, know what was involved in our United Nations obligations.

Canadian defence policy, therefore, until June of this year, had been based on the concept of providing a small, highly-skilled regular army, charged with responsibility of doing its immediate share of North American defence, especially in the Arctic, and designed to be capable of rapid expansion in the event of a general war which might require Canada to be defended outside of Canada. The furnishing to the United Nations on short notice of expeditionary forces capable of quick deployment in distant areas wherever acts of aggression might take place had not, I admit, entered into our planning as it had not entered into the planning of any other country.

The United States has therefore, up to the present, had to bear almost alone the brunt of assisting the South Koreans on land. They have done so with speed, with great courage and with growing effectiveness. In spite of terrific handicaps, United States troops have, of course, fought magnificently, not only for their own country but for the free world as a whole. Now, however, they are beginning to receive reinforcements of ground troops from other countries with forces in the Far East; and to these will be added, if parliament approves, the Canadian Special Force which has been raised to carry out our United Nations obligation for collective defence;--Korea being the place where at the