## The deterrent would feature:

- sufficient, survivable and operationally "ready" nuclear forces;
- robust Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence systems (C3I);
- effective early warning capabilities;
- comprehensive planning and training for nuclear operations consistent with the strategy, and;
- the "political will" to employ such forces if and when required.<sup>3</sup>

A "triad", consisting of sea, air and mobile-land based systems would characterize the force – providing both the redundancy, mobility and dispersion essential to its survivability and effectiveness. The force would also possess the ability to shift quickly from peacetime deployment to fully employable forces, and would retain a capacity to shift alert status even in the face of significant degradation through repetitive hostile strikes.<sup>4</sup>

C3I would be developed with survivability in mind. And warning and intelligence would be maximized through the creation of space-based systems. Beyond this, nuclear forces would be tightly controlled – with the authority for release residing in the Prime Minister and designated successors. Throughout, deterrent effectiveness would be bolstered by an ongoing and unrestrained research and development capability.

A range of safety procedures would guard all nuclear systems against theft, loss, or damage, and the government would ensure against additional nuclear incidents through the creation of an appropriate disaster control system.<sup>6</sup>

A number of initiatives aimed at increasing stability and eliminating nuclear arms would be pursued in tandem with the development of the deterrent force. Specifically, New Delhi would press for the creation of an international treaty banning the first use of nuclear weapons, internationally-binding and unqualified negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), the pursuit of further nuclear arms control and an array of appropriate regional risk-reduction and confidence-building measures.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.