

cruise missiles (ALCMs) and submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and the linkage of an agreement reducing strategic offensive forces to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the general question of space-based defences.

Nevertheless, it was soon clear that the Bush Administration would not continue the negotiations without conducting a review of its own position. Key personnel appointments suggested that there might be significant changes in US policy. In particular, Brent Scowcroft, the new National Security Advisor, was on record as supporting the single-warhead, mobile Midgetman ICBM whereas the Reagan negotiating position was to ban all mobile missiles. Prior to taking office, Scowcroft had also raised the possibility that the United States might consider a total ban on SLCMs. He had also been critical of Star Wars testing that might be in conflict with the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty, arguing that ten years of further adherence to the Treaty would not seriously affect Star Wars research. The appointment in February 1989 of Richard Burt as Head of the US delegation in Geneva further suggested that changes could occur, since Burt soon raised for discussion suggestions for a ban on the Soviet 'heavy' ICBM missile, the SS-18, and a ban on mobile missiles with multiple warheads (the Soviet SS-24, of which a small number are already deployed, and the MX missile, if Bush chose to deploy it in a mobile form.)

In the first months of 1989, however, it was not the details of the START agreement which occupied the attention of the administration, but the overall structure and modernization of US strategic forces, whether considered in isolation from arms control, or in a post-START environment. Perhaps because of this protracted internal debate, when the two sides finally resumed negotiations in June 1989, some six months after Bush took office, the conclusions of the strategic review had still not been formally announced. Nor was it evident that the US team had returned to Geneva with a set of proposals significantly different to that of the Reagan Administration.

A number of factors explained both the lengthy delay in resuming the START negotiations, and the ultimate return of the negotiating team to Geneva with relatively little change in position. First, the protracted confirmation hearings of the Bush nominee for Secretary of Defense, John G. Tower, and the ultimate Senate rejection of the nomination, meant that the influential voice of the Office of Secretary of Defense was missing from the internal debate in the first critical months of the Bush Administration.

Second, in early 1989, the strategic arms negotiations, for twenty years the cornerstone of the superpower arms

control relationship, seemed to fade in importance in comparison with the emerging prospect of a conventional arms agreement in Europe. In May 1989, Richard Burt denied reports that the administration now favoured a conventional forces agreement over a START treaty. However, there was little doubt that the unprecedented opportunity to reduce troops in Europe detracted from any attempt to give fresh impetus to the START negotiations.

Third, budgetary constraints combined with service programmes seemed likely to play an increasingly important role in determining US strategic force deployments no matter what the imperatives of arms control. On 25 April 1989, the new Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, submitted a revised budget to Congress. A total of \$10 billion had been cut from the original FY 1990 budget submitted in January by the outgoing President.

The United States Air Force had expressed a strong preference, mainly on the grounds of cost effectiveness, for the rail-mobile version of the multiple-warhead MX ICBM. The Congress, on the other hand, showed continuing strong support for the single-warhead, mobile Midgetman. Cheney was obliged to opt for both missiles. In his budget submission he proposed to build and deploy fifty rail garrison MX missiles by 1992, while continuing to develop Midgetman with a view to deploying it beginning in 1997.

As Cheney pointed out, this approach would match the current Soviet mobile ICBM deployments — the single warhead SS-25 and the multiple-warhead SS-24. It was nevertheless in conflict with the US negotiating position, which called for a ban on all mobile missiles. Cheney later explained that the United States would continue to seek a ban as long as Congressional approval of mobile deployments was withheld, and until the Soviets agreed to a verification regime which would permit verifiable limits on mobile deployments.

His budget proposal barely satisfied Congress, however, where influential supporters of Midgetman such as Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, worried that Midgetman would become a victim of budget cutbacks once the rail-mobile MX has been deployed. Such fears were reinforced by the apparent inability of the administration to set priorities in planned US strategic modernization programmes despite the prospects of a long-term decline in the defence budget. In the same submission, for example, Cheney reaffirmed support for the B-2 Stealth bomber, though he planned to slow down its production by one year, and announced increased spending on the B-1B bomber. Commenting on the continuing US plan to deploy 230 B-1B and B-2s, in a February speech in Norway, former special advisor Paul