

**Lesson No. 9: Private industry, using proven technology, can make an important contribution to the arms limitation and verification process.**

The management of the SFM component of the verification enterprise symbolized an impressive merger of effort between the US government and American private industry. Private industry not only provided much of the technical expertise and personnel necessary for operating the early warning system, but also the sensor technology, with its history of good performance and low maintenance requirements — which contributed significantly to the success of the verification mission. In addition, private industry proved capable of responding to the technical challenges posed by the verification requirements of the Sinai II Agreement and the Peace Treaty within severe time and manpower constraints, in a way that might not have been possible for US government agencies.<sup>40</sup> On short notice, an elaborate verification system was implemented quickly and managed successfully for six years.

The implications of this unique kind of cooperation for the verification of future agreements are considerable, if only because the prevailing perception has been one of private enterprise supporting military ventures and the expansion of the arms race rather than peace-building efforts.

**Lesson No. 10: Countries with expertise in verification and peacekeeping such as Canada could make a significant contribution to the verification of agreements similar to those in the Sinai.**

The success of the Sinai experience depended to a large extent on integrating such traditional peacekeeping functions as observer patrols, the establishment of control posts, and on-site inspections, with aerial surveillance and ground-based surveillance technology (used for verifying access to the strategic Mitla and Gidi passes and large tracts of the Sinai desert). Given the “twin” capabilities required for this task — peacekeeping and verification — it would appear that Canada is in a unique position to meet both these requirements. Canada not only has long and ongoing operational experience in peacekeeping but also possesses significant technical, industrial and analytical expertise that could be directed toward verifying future agreements between regional adversaries. Making a contribution of this kind would seem to mesh well with the objectives of a middle power committed to international peacekeeping.

<sup>40</sup> This is not to suggest that US government agencies were not capable of doing the job *per se*. Rather, the SSM was concerned that government agencies would not be able to meet its deadline of February 22, 1976 for initial operating capability if it did not turn to private companies with experience in managing operations at remote sites. It is interesting to note here that in its public competition for contractors, the US government sought expertise in the following areas:

- a) Previous, recent experience in systems and logistics management contracts at remote international sites;
- b) Recent experience with installation, operation, and maintenance of remote sensing and surveillance systems, including acoustic, infra-red, magnetic and seismic sensors and related read-out equipment; and
- c) Evidence of availability of skilled manpower to meet the time requirements.

Cited in United States Sinai Support Mission, *Report to the Congress*, April 13, 1976, Appendix F.

