

ity to communicate directly with adversaries during a time of crisis is assumed to (a) prevent a crisis from escalating and (b) control a crisis, should it begin to escalate. This type of measure is so intuitively reasonable that it seems completely non-controversial. Nevertheless, this type of CBM assumes that rational people will employ such mechanisms to resolve a crisis clearly and quickly without deceit and with minimal misunderstanding. It assumes that they *will be able* to understand each other well enough to avoid counter-productive misperception.

- (3) Notification Measures (the timely announcement of all military manoeuvres and movements beyond a specified size, including information about the nature of the manoeuvre or movement).

As in the case of Information CBMs, the presumption here is that increased amounts of information about the nature of adversary activities (in this case, potentially very threatening types of activities) will lead to increased understanding and a reduced likelihood of misperception. The advance notification of manoeuvres and military movements of various sorts, any of which *might* be otherwise mistaken for the preparation for attack, is widely thought to reduce the chances of war by accident. Again, this thinking reflects the rational "urge" to decrease uncertainty and to gain increased knowledge. The aim, as with the other measures, is to counter misperception, increase predictability and reduce uncertainty.

- (4) Manoeuvre Observer Conduct Measures (rules establishing how observers at manoeuvres should be treated as well as how they should behave).

This type of CBM is relatively restricted and deals with nothing new when compared with the other Information and Communication CBMs. As with the others, it stresses the importance of increasing knowledge about and under-

standing of a potential adversary, its capabilities and (to the extent possible) intentions in order to reduce the possibility of genuine misunderstandings.

(B) – *Constraint or Surprise Attack CBMs*

- (1) Inspection Measures (the intrusive monitoring of constraint-related behaviour according to specific agreed criteria as well as the associated use of "early warning devices").

These measures are, by and large, more aggressive, specific and narrow undertakings compared with the essentially "educational" information CBMs. They isolate particularly troublesome or worrisome features of adversary forces, almost always associated with "surprise attack", and attempt to provide the indicators for ascertaining the status (or, at least, broad hints of the status) of those features. The key indicators are certain types of behaviour and equipment. The basic idea is to attend to them and thus more ably interpret the real intentions of a potential enemy. Thus, one can avoid the misperception of non-hostile acts but also gain some degree of advance warning if a surprise attack is actually being prepared. Also wrapped up in these types of measures is the assumption that a party with no aggressive intentions and plans to hide could not possibly object to the use of such indicators. The willingness to participate is closely tied to the enhancement of "confidence". Also present in the reasoning behind this type of CBM is the belief that if you know where to look, you can learn almost anything – a classic expression of rational expectations. As before, the fundamental concern is to control misperception (and anxiety) through increased information and knowledge.

- (2) Non-Interference Measures (agreements not to interfere with and, in some cases, to cooperate with the use of National Technical Means (NTM) of verification).

This is a simple measure. The mere act of facilitating the use of NTM is seen to be narrowly useful for the observation

