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obligation to tell us what his answer to that particular question would be.

Some of us have also been in touch with our fellow Canadians in Alberta, principally—not just in Alberta but elsewhere, in the north too—who are concerned about jobs. Again, I am going on the public record, and in part on private conversation. A key spokesperson for the Amoco Corporation said that Amoco will not guarantee the existing jobs in Dome Petroleum in its take-over. If TransCanada PipeLines—whatever else one might say about the impact of its takeover—won the bid, a lot of things would have to be considered, and when it comes to jobs, TransCanada has not only said to me privately but publicly that it would guarantee the existing jobs in Dome Petroleum. If that is the criteria, and this Party is interested in those men and women in Alberta whose jobs are dependent on this corporation and who have been in a precarious existence for many many months now, and we have to judge on the basis of these public commitments, then it seems to us that TransCanada's offer is better than Amoco's. If the Government has evidence to the contrary, then the Government has an obligation to provide that evidence to the House of Commons.

It is our view that the Government is simply irresponsible in standing back and watching this whole drama unfold, a drama that has a profound effect on the nation as a whole, and on a particular part of our nation. The Government in our view should be involved in the discussion. It should be actively involved with a number of departments in a number of ministries in the Government involved in the discussions with Amoco officials and with TransCanada officials and, I add importantly here, Petro-Canada.

This Parliament in the last decade created Petro-Canada, like most other petroleum companies around the world, on the perfectly straightforward national interest policy basis that it makes sense to have a large—not simply national but large—public role in the energy sector. I simply cannot understand why in 1987, when we have a large company like Petro-Canada in the public sector, the Government of Canada has not given a mandate to Petro-Canada saying, get in there, have a look at the situation at Dome, report back to us and tell us, should there be a joint venture solution, should there be a public solution—give us your expertise. It is the height of irresponsibility for the Minister of Energy to tell the President of Petro-Canada or his leading officers to stay away from this situation. This is exactly the kind of situation that Petro-Canada was created to be involved in. We believe that the Government should now involve itself as quickly as possible through the active participation of Petro-Canada.

I want now to say something very specifically about Amoco, and why we have some concerns. The first point about that particular bid is, of course, that Amoco is owned 100 per cent outside our country. There is no Canadian president, no Canadian board, and no Canadian shareholders, unlike a number of the other multinational corporations that have made an effort to Canadianize a good part of their operations

with beneficial results, at least in part, and I will come to that in just a minute.

The next point is that Amoco has shown no particular interest in Canada as a nation. Its performance record when you compare it with other multinational corporations in this sector is simply lamentable. I have had a look at the performance of Amoco in comparison with Imperial, Shell, Gulf and Texaco for the past two years. I want to share some of this information with the House tonight.

If you look at the year 1985, in dividends paid out by these companies, what do you find? You find that Imperial paid out some \$268 million in dividends, Shell paid out \$83 million, Gulf paid out \$122 million, Texaco paid out \$151 million and Amoco paid out \$200 million.

Some Hon. Members: Good.

Mr. Broadbent: They are saying good.

Mr. Speaker: I very much regret interrupting the Hon. Member for Oshawa (Mr. Broadbent) but we are bound by the rules here. The Hon. Member is reaching the end of his speech; in fact, he may be overtime. Under the circumstances it is often the disposition of the House to give the Hon. Member a few more minutes. I can ask Hon. Members if they would agree to do that.

Some Hon. Members: Agreed.

Mr. Broadbent: Mr. Speaker, I express my gratitude to Members of the House for that decision.

Those are figures for 1985. I want to move to what the same corporations have done in dividend payments for 1986. Imperial Oil paid out \$262 million, Shell paid out \$82 million, Gulf paid out \$159 million, Texaco paid out \$145 million and Amoco \$686 million. I want also to put on the record for each of these two years what the five companies have done in capital investment for the development of our energy resources in the future. Then I want to compare those figures, one with the other—the capital investment record with the dividend pay-out record. I think some rather disturbing information will emerge from a comparison of the Amoco Corporation with the other four major multinational companies working in our country.

In 1985 Imperial Oil spent \$885 million in capital and exploration expenditures, Shell spent \$367 million, Gulf spent \$378 million, Texaco spent \$267 million and Amoco, which is down at the bottom of the list, spent \$190 million.

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For the past year, 1986, what was the record of investment in Canada in the development of our future energy resources? Imperial invested \$457 million, Shell invested \$361 million, Gulf invested \$262 million, Texaco invested \$258 million, and Amoco is once again at the bottom of the list with an investment of only \$107 million.