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This view is, I know, at variance with the popular tendency to discount the value of the Anglo-French and the United States papers because they have been rejected by one delegation whose agreement is, of course, essential to their implementation. It is true, and always will be, that by the very nature of the subject the Great Powers have a kind of veto in disarmament negotiations; for if they are not all agreed there can be no disarmament. However, I think we make a mistake to label as a "failure" talks which produced the first outline, which either side has submitted since negotiations began, of a comprehensive workable disarmament plan. Perhaps the Canadian delegation is in a position to express such an opinion more forcibly than either the United States, United Kingdom or French delegations because the Canadian delegation on the Sub-Committee did not submit proposals of its own.

The new proposals advanced by the Western Powers at the London talks sought to come to grips with two problems the Canadian Government has long regarded as central. First, we have maintained that an effective disarmament programme must be comprehensive, that it must embrace both nuclear and conventional weapons in a single agreement, providing for effective control and supervision of the various reductions and prohibitions agreed upon. Such a comprehensive programme would go forward almost automatically as confidence increases and the control organ reports that it is ready for the next stage, until the total prohibition and abolition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction has been accomplished. Second, we have insisted that we in the West could not consider depriving ourselves of our most powerful weapon before we know in detail what kind of inspection and control system the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept and indeed before they have accepted it and put it into operation. Without an adequate system of international inspection and control, which would give each participating State adequate assurances that disarmament pledges would be honoured, no disarmament system can be effective. On both these points -- the need for a comprehensive and phased programme and on the requirements with regard to inspection -- the Western Powers have put forward new proposals.

The United States working paper, submitted by Mr. Patterson at the London talks, was a notable contribution to the detailed study of the control problem. The Canadian Government supports this paper. It is because we feel that it did not receive the serious attention of our Soviet colleagues which its importance merited that I propose to refer at some length to this problem.

First, however, I should like to comment on the French and United Kingdom proposals on phasing which give us for the first time a detailed timetable comprising the following elements of a comprehensive disarmament programme: first, the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials to peaceful purposes; second, major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments; third, the establishment of a control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions.