

may not necessarily do this covertly.⁶¹

To a certain extent, the proliferation of RMA technologies, at least the most advanced versions, will be limited by resource and budget constraints. Some of America's European and Asian allies will be in the best position to follow the U.S. lead in acquiring the systems either through indigenous manufacture or, because they are allies, through transfer. This will especially be the case if Washington believes that such a transfer will enhance interoperability. Most countries, will be unable to afford or integrate the systems and may seek out cheaper systems, particularly where certain types of technologies can be adapted from those available in the civilian market. At the same time,

“while certain capabilities for intelligence, communication and targeting are becoming widely accessible, other remain highly specialized and at a degree of sophistication that is unavailable outside the higher military spheres, including the most advanced forms of system integration. In general there will be hybrid conventional capabilities, acquired selectively and in an uneven and uncoordinated fashion.”⁶²

Because of concern that advantage may be lost, any attempt to limit the spread of RMA technologies will likely be the result of efforts on the part of those states, the United States and its principal allies, to try and curtail the spread of its most advanced technologies rather than with efforts “at international regulation of the relevant markets.”⁶³ Even here there may be difficulties and even once advanced systems become more readily obtainable. As with Cohen, Lawrence Freedman also points to the cruise missile, “the paradigmatic weapon of the RMA.” It can be launched from a variety of platforms. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTRC) which seeks regulation through a common export policy and includes systems able to carry chemical, nuclear or conventional weapons, now has 29 states. But, other types of delivery systems, such as “aircraft and cruise missiles used with stand-off platforms” are outside the scope of the MTRC.⁶⁴ The regime “cannot cope with aircraft-and many of the components of cruise missiles that are similar to those of aircraft.”⁶⁵

In July 1996, 33 countries signed the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Control for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies. Efforts have been made to strengthen the agreement. But as Keller and Nolan noted, this agreement “has received scant attention from the policy community and ridicule from the arms lobby and it is presently languishing with no high-level

⁶¹ Hundley, *Past Revolutions*, p. 37-8.

⁶² Freedman, *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs*, p. 70.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Spear, review, p. 547.

⁶⁵ Freedman, *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs*. p. 71