

belligerents to organize their forces and prepare for demobilization and the handing over of weapons.⁵²

The micro-disarmament component of the mandate probably requires a central coordinating staff within the Mission Headquarters and perhaps a disarmament staff at the Directorate of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York. Leaving the implementation to sector and contingent commanders to carry out in accordance with their own interpretation may cause uneven application and indifferent results. Just as each headquarters has an operations officer, a logistics officer, an information officer and in some cases even personnel designated as economics and agricultural officers, so too should it have a disarmament officer. The staff should be made directly responsible for coordinating all aspects of the disarmament component of an agreement. If difficulties arise then they should be able to address it through the "disarmament net" all the way to the Mission Headquarters. This is not to suggest that commanders, contingent or sector be bypassed. What a proper staff net does is relieve the commander from addressing specialized detail. Responsibility would include the development and application of standing operating procedures and the organization of weapons collection points, verification, security and destruction.

In conjunction with a proper staff system, disarmament teams could be formed with the sole responsibility for the micro-disarmament aspects of the agreement. These would be officers and NCO's, knowledgeable in weapons identification, verification and destruction.⁵³ Depending on the mandate of the mission, they could work alone or in conjunction with sector and/or contingent commanders and their forces.

If a buy-back or reward system is used to encourage the surrender of weapons then it should be a sliding scale of reward directly related to the lethality of the firearm concerned. As was done in Haiti, automatic weapons in good condition would warrant a much greater reward than a broken shotgun (which may not warrant any reward).⁵⁴ Another method,

⁵² If a peace enforcement operation is mounted where no agreement exists and the use of force is deemed probable, then disarmament activity must be implemented quickly through force, reward or a volunteer system. It may be better in some circumstances to go in with large forces relying on coercion to ensure disarmament before the novelty wears off on the belligerents and they can adjust to the new circumstances. Above all the operation must be able to guarantee the protection of those that are disarmed.

⁵³ Disarmament teams would be similar in some respects to verification teams now used by most signatory states to the CFE Treaty.

⁵⁴ There may be a risk that individuals would steal from caches or each other if too big a reward was placed on certain weapons. As well, there is a belief that cash rewards only fuel the arms market as the cash is used to buy better weapons. It is perhaps better to use goods in combination with a limited amount of money, credits or other types of reward. Rewards may not be as useful or may prove to costly to implement in states where extreme poverty is not a problem. While \$400.00 US may be very attractive in Haiti as a reward, it may be less alluring in Northern Ireland.