


its GNP).<sup>2</sup> Libya, with a population of 5.4 million, spent about \$1.6 billion on its armed forces in 1993, while Chad, with 6.5 million people, spent only \$30 million. It is difficult to argue that the Libyan security environment is that much more threatening than that facing Chad (especially in light of the subsequent resolution of the inter-clan conflict in Chad), and Libya's level of militarization is more likely the product of its oil wealth and the regional and global ambitions of its ruler. A sharper *prima facie* contrast between necessary and excessive military spending can hardly be found.



<sup>2</sup> Sudanese defence expenditures are highly uncertain, in part because of the ongoing civil war. The ACDA does not, even in its most recent edition (*WMEAT, 1995*, covering up to 1994) offer any estimate for 1993 and 1994 military expenditures. It also shows a *quadrupling* of spending between 1990 and 1992. While the IISS data also showed a large upward movement in 1992 defence spending (to \$1,010 million, *Military Balance, 1992-93*; revised downward to \$766 million in the *Military Balance, 1993-94*). IISS data for 1993 and 1994 (*Military Balance, 1995-96*) shows a dramatic drop in spending (to \$304 and \$306 million respectively). There is no way to confirm this figure, and only the ACDA data has been listed here.