

Despite these reservations, in early 1986, an INF agreement was clearly attractive to the United States. In addition to resolving the question of how to define 'strategic', the Soviet offer had conceded two major points to Washington: the exclusion of British and French forces, and the restriction of a prospective agreement to intermediate-range missiles.

Further, the Soviet willingness to decouple the INF agreement from the debate over permissible research on SDI offered an opportunity for an early arms control agreement. This in itself was thought sufficient to assure the success of a second summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev.

In February 1986, therefore, President Reagan made a counter-offer which effectively offered three options: (1) *the elimination of Euro-based SS-20s, GLCMs and Pershing IIs over three years with 'proportionate' reductions in the Soviet SS-20s based in Asia;* (2) *a phased reduction from global limits on the same systems, including, presumably, missiles stored in the United States;* and (3) *a reduction of the Euro-missiles to lower ceilings with proportionate reductions in the Asian-based SS-20s.*

The last of these options reflected a further difficulty for the US in its attempt to negotiate on behalf of its allies. Whereas Japan had objected to an arrangement which appeared to ignore Japanese security concerns, the European allies continued to express serious doubts about an arms control agreement which would entirely remove the GLCMs and Pershing IIs from Europe. Unofficially, two reasons were cited. One concerned public perceptions: what would be the reaction to the removal of missiles that had just been installed after a prolonged and divisive public debate in most of the NATO countries involved? The other, perhaps more important in the long term, was the view that US INF missiles were necessary to maintain the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee to its NATO allies.

The third US option — to reduce but not eliminate the GLCMs and Pershing IIs — was clearly designed to meet these European concerns. Prior to the Reykjavik summit, it appeared that the Soviets had accepted this position. Their offer, as reported, seemed to meet European interests, since it allowed each side to retain 200 INF warheads: in the Soviet case, 100 in the European zone and 100 in Soviet Asia; in the US case, 100 in Europe and 100 in the United States. However, surprisingly perhaps, the Reykjavik discussions centred on the proposal to remove **all** medium-range warheads from Europe, leaving only 100 in Soviet Asia and 100 in the US.

At Reykjavik the discussion implied the decoupling of INF from the question of strategic forces and SDI, but in post-Reykjavik comments it became clear that this was no longer the Soviet position. After several months of unproductive negotiations in Geneva, on 28

February 1987 Gorbachev renewed the offer to disconnect INF from the debate surrounding the SDI. Essentially, the Reykjavik proposal (no SS-20s, Pershing IIs or cruise missiles in Europe, 100 warheads to be retained in Soviet Asia and the United States) has emerged as the mutually accepted position of the superpowers, but with certain continuing constraints. The first is the continued reluctance of the European NATO countries, in particular West Germany, to accept what they perceive to be the nuclear 'decoupling' of Europe and the United States which might result from an INF agreement. The second is the Soviet short-range INF (SRINF) (see Table 3), on which the Soviet position has wavered. However, the Gorbachev offer to Secretary of State Shultz on 14 April 1987 offers the strong prospect that the removal and possible dismantlement of the short-range SS-12s, SS-22s and SS-23s will be explicitly linked to an agreement on INF. If so, proposals to eliminate SRINF will bring into focus the debate about the conventional force balance in Europe.

Table 3 Short-range Nuclear Forces (500-1000 km)

(Global)

United States	Range (km)	Missiles	Warheads	Total Warheads
Pershing Ia	720	72	1	72
Soviet Union				
SS-12/SS-22	900	110-120	1	110-120
SS-23	500	20+?	1	20+?

Sources: Arms Control Association; IISS, *The Military Balance 1986-87*; US Department of Defence, *Soviet Military Power, 1987*.

III. DEFENCE AND SPACE ARMS

Technically, the negotiations at Geneva in this area can include issues other than those directly relating to SDI. Specifically, anti-satellite and anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBMs), which are claimed by both sides to be compatible with the ABM Treaty, may be included in the discussions. In the US, for example, research into ATBMs is now under the auspices of the SDI office; since the ABM Treaty prohibits the transfer of systems or components to other states, the potential application of SDI research to the NATO theatre will certainly be challenged by the Soviet Union. At present, however, the central issues are:

- a) the limits of permissible research under the ABM Treaty