

vided, to be dragged by the men on light Indian sledges or toboggans, along with provisions for twelve days. This force left Montreal in February and marched up the frozen snow-covered Richelieu river and the lakes for 150 miles to Fort William Henry, with a week's rest at Ticonderoga en route. After a week of unavailing assaults on the English fort the expedition withdrew into Canada." The season was one of such severity as to cause mention to be made of the intense cold, in letters of the period. And yet although casualties from the fighting are recorded, and cases of snow-blindness on the retreat are carefully noted, no mention is made of any casualties from the cold. The men were properly protected by good clothing, suitable food and a knowledge of the personal precautions to be taken in cold weather. Finally, a point not to be overlooked because of its other sanitary bearings—the expedition was of short duration. Let me now turn to a different picture, the American invaders blockading Quebec in the winter of 1775-76. Enfeebled by disease, ill-clad and ill-fed, scarcely 20 soldiers were ever so poorly equipped to face the blizzards of the low St. Lawrence. And yet in spite of the hardships they endured from the cold and snow—and they must have been many—they maintained a blockade of the city, until the opening of navigation brought to the beleaguered garrison the anxiously awaited reinforcements. The invaders retreated, the blockade was over. But how close had this sick and half-starved army been to success. Another turn of Fortune's wheel, another weight in the balance of Fate, and Quebec had fallen. And with its fall the conquest of Canada would have been an accomplished fact, achieved by an army—so-called for want of a better name—but an army led by far-seeing and determined leaders—Montgomery and Arnold—who rose superior to discouragement till death and jealousy removed them in turn from the scene.

Arnold's expedition until it joined forces with Montgomery's was like Rigaud's, a raid pure and simple—another instance of "La Petite Guerre" on a larger scale. But Montgomery's invasion was a different thing. He led his army into an enemy's country, carrying on military operations and continuing to advance in obedience to the developing situation, at a season of the year when by all precedent he should have been safely back in his own country, with his men dispersed to their homes. He did what had never been attempted before, he conducted a winter campaign in Canada; and as a result he all but conquered the country. Who would have been the result had his army been trained, equipped and disciplined on the standard set by the Japanese troops on the Sha-Bo?

But surely Montgomery was not the first or only general in this country to whom an opportunity came, to deal a staggering blow to an enemy by means of a winter campaign. If so, why did these others not act? The closing years of the French wars found the opposing forces facing each other astride the northern route to Canada via Lake Champlain, the French at Crown Point and Ticonderoga, and the English at Fort William Henry and Fort Edward. It was the obvious object of each to drive the other back, the one on Albany with a possibility of capturing it, the other on Montreal with a like prospect of success. Why did not Montcalm retain at Ticonderoga until the winter the 6,000 troops, mostly regulars, gathered there during the summer of 1756, and lead them down the frozen Hudson against the English colonies? During the past summer he had dealt a severe blow to English prestige in the New World by his capture of Oswego. The 10,000 English troops, composed almost altogether of raw colonial levies, which faced him during the summer, had on the approach of winter, been disbanded and dispersed. There was nothing to oppose his advance but a small garrison at Fort William Henry and a few permanent companies scattered throughout the colonies. Was it not the French moment—the opportune moment—for action? Would a European general of to-day, endowed with the