

the mere sake of resistance, oppose each other in such a way; they would not venture to do it. He did not remember that there had been any really difficult matter of this kind for a long time. This House had rejected the Squatters' Bill, as it was called, seven or eight times after it had been passed by the Assembly, but that had not impaired the good understanding between them. Indeed the effect had been of the best. The hon. life-member from Cobourg [Hon. Mr. BOULTON], whom he did not see in his place, had, by the force of reasoning, convinced the House that the bill was destructive of the rights of property, and the consequence was that, year by year, the measure had been pruned of its most offensive features, until now, as he was informed, it was hardly open to objection. He could not recall another instance of persistent difference of opinion between the Chambers. The real danger of collision would be where one Chamber invaded the prerogatives of the other, and that danger, if it existed at all, would be greatly increased were the Legislative Council made elective. (Hear, hear.) If the members were elected they might say, "We come from the people just as directly as the members of the Assembly do, and our authority is, therefore, as full and complete as theirs. Nay, more, for where we each represent 1000 electors, they only each represent 300, and we have, therefore, as much right to initiate money bills and impost bills as they have." Make the Council purely elective, and he would not promise that an agitation of this kind would not spring up. It had not been a theme as yet on the floor of the House, but it was well known that it had been freely discussed in the corridors, and if the subject had not been formally introduced, it was probably because it was thought by those who debated it that they could not rely upon the life-members. (Hear, hear.) Let the Council propose to deal with taxation and the elective system would be sure in the course of time to urge it on to do so, and immediately the spirit of the Assembly would be aroused to resistance. This would be the way to provoke collisions, and with an elective Council it was not unlikely at all to be resorted to. In England, where the Upper House was composed of a class entirely distinct from the Commons, and having interests, as a general thing, diverse from those of the people, even there the collisions between the two branches had been but infrequent. Indeed there had been only one very serious collision in the course of centuries. When, however, such conjunctures arose, the crown overcame

them by the appointment of a sufficient number of peers whose political views accorded with those of the government. The right to sit in the House of Lords being, however, hereditary, the son generally inherited the politics of his father and so the character of the body was always pretty well understood; but be it what it might, and as much as possible removed from popular influences, it had yet learned so far to respect the will of the people as to know when to make concession of its own opinions. He did not say that it bowed to every breeze and instantly yielded to every demand, nor did he think that any Legislative Upper Chamber should do so, and be content merely to reflect the temper and complexion of the other branch. On the contrary, he held that when it had good and sufficient evidence sufficient to satisfy itself that a proposed measure was unjust, it was bound to resist, and public opinion which generally came out right in the end, would sustain it in such an attitude. But there was very much less danger in countries like this that difference of opinion would even be as frequent between the Legislative Chambers as between the Lords and Commons in England, and the reason was clear: our Legislative Councillors would not come from so different a class of society to the general population, as the peers of the British nation, compared with the people of that nation. The lords had ideas of caste and privileges which none of our people were imbued with, and the common sympathy existing between all classes here would be felt equally by the Legislative Councillors and the Members of the Assembly. Both would be equally subjected to popular influences and be more or less controlled by them. The interests of the Legislative Councillor, though a nominee of the Crown, would be the same as those of the mass, and the legislation which would be good for them would, as a general thing, be good for him too. He would have no ancestral estates, privileges, immunities and titles to protect, like the peers of England. He would be affected by the social changes which affected others, and would be moved by the same aims and aspirations as his friends around him. This being the case, it was not very probable that his opinions would even be set in opposition to those of other men as to make it likely that he would come in collision with them, or that, as a House, the Council would be in danger of a serious quarrel with the Assembly. Then the changes which time would inevitably bring about in a body like the proposed Legis-