breeders seems to be less immediately significant for safety and the environment than the breadth and penetration of foreign participation in the work of reactor-based disposition in Russia.

To ensure the long-term success of disposition against nuclear-safety and environmental vulnerabilities, it is therefore desirable to move as much military MOX as rapidly as possible out of the country, or to move substantial amounts of foreign technology and practice into Russia so as to improve on the indigenous capacity to get disposition right. All of this sounds rather like striving to protect disposition against environmental and other hazards. Still, if disposition is not to be disabled by catastrophe or cumulative harm, the parties will have to attend to environmental and safety needs in Russia very directly.

Even if other approaches have superior nuclear-safety and environmental-protection potential, might we nevertheless improve on the Agreement while continuing broadly to rely on existing Russian reactors for comparatively slow rates of disposition? Part of the answer is already before us. It's there as a counterpoint to what's been said about the export of Russian WGPu to another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which are better equipped to handle MOX. The answer is to address Russian safety and environmental problems at source. This the donors could do by treating disposition as an opportunity to export best international practices, and to transfer them to a Russia that's in need. Quite a lot will be said about this when we turn directly to the scene in Russia. Suffice it for the moment to suggest that significant gains for environmental and nuclear safety in Russia may be found in the design and operation of an international management entity that's to be part of the Multilateral Agreement.

But still, why attempt to do anything much with the Agreement as it stands when it's clear that significantly more cost-effective variants promise more for nuclear safety and environmental protection in Russia? The answer is that the Agreement is better than the alternatives when it comes to irreversibility, and irreversibility trumps nuclear safety and environmental protection. Though all three domains are complementary, if basic international security requirements are not well met there would be little reason to carry on with the design and operation of a disposition programme, whatever its safety and environmental promise.

### *Points Toward a Strategy of Disposition*

Certain of the U.S. approaches to disposition, such as export-only or reliance on new breeder reactors, are more cost-effective than the Agreement as it stands, but also promise to underwrite Minatom's nuclear fuel-cycle ambitions. If acted upon, they would accentuate the B&B problem. Before donors acted upon these alternatives, they would have to explain why they weren't instead helping Russia to convert and store its military plutonium under IAEA control for blend-down and commercial use many years in the future. No good explanation could be found, aside perhaps from the assertion that Russia would not accept the loss of income and political leverage entailed in going to powder and, in effect, to partial immobilization as distinct from reactor-based disposition. But then it would become clear to all that the donors were going along with an accentuated B&B approach owing to the insistence of a Russia that wanted to apply income from the disposition of military plutonium to the accumulation of civil plutonium. It might even seem that in going along with an accentuated rather than a lessened B&B approach, donors were yielding to extortion by a Russia that aimed to have things both ways: to join in