

The US position stemmed from an initial predetermination that Rwanda was solely a civil war with few, and certainly no over-riding, human rights or humanitarian aspects. This was combined with senior administration instructions to use Rwanda as the example on how peacekeeping missions were to be mandated and created in the future. Middle ranking officials once they had become more informed as to the genocidal nature of Rwanda, had difficulty in educating their superiors and reportedly were dismayed at US support for downsizing UNAMIR.

By May 17th it was obvious that the UN had to step back into the conflict, and the SC passed Res 918/94 which increased the size and mandate of UNAMIR. In advance of its passing, there was protracted debate as to whether it should be a Chapter VI or VII operation. Canada and others wanted a Chapter VII operation, and in lieu of achieving this, demanded to see what the RoEs would be prior<sup>16</sup> to accepting to commit troops.

The US insistence on Chapter VI stemmed from their black and white interpretation of Chapter VII. They felt that Chapter VII was only to sanction moving the UN into a confrontational war situation with parties to a conflict. They did not understand the import of Chapter VII Art. 40 which is very much a transitional stage. Art. 40 would have allowed an interpositional mandate for UNAMIR II, which would have given several countries the opportunity to gain a clearer understanding of events before opting for Art 41 or 42 action. A better understanding of graduated response capable under Chapter VII would have served to shorted debate on Resolution 918, lessened the acrimony of the debate, and hastened substantive action.

#### **Recommendation**

*Canada should encourage debate within the UN as to the usefulness of Charter Art. 40 in achieving a graduated transition from Chapter VI operations to Chapter VII Arts. 41 & 42 operations.*

The US government's strict adherence to PDD 25 and strongly held conviction that the UN was not capable of rapid deployment of UNAMIR II, also affected the rate of implementation of SC Res 918/94. At US insistence<sup>17</sup>, UNAMIR II proceeded in two stages, the first being the redeployment of "UNAMIR military observers currently in Nairobi and to bring up to full strength the elements of the mechanized infantry battalion currently in Rwanda". The US then wanted to review the operation in its entirety with an eye on PDD 25 criteria before proceeding to stage two. This created a substantive degree of uncertainty about both time constraints and the second phase itself. Troop contributing nations (TCNs) not already so inclined now started to ponder the dangers of involvement and questioned the field headquarter's command, control, and communications capacity.

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<sup>16</sup> It should be noted that this was the first time that a TCN had demanded and had received clarification of and input into the RoEs.

<sup>17</sup> Comments from other nations made it clear that apart from possibly Russia, they all had wanted to proceed to a rapid and full deployment of UNAMIR II.