accurately captured the predominant strains of thought in the professional literature circa 1984 (whether mistaken or not) and it usefully summarized them in the form of an accessible composite definition.

However, in retrospect, it is clear that the effort was defective in some key ways. First of all, it was more uncritical than it should have been, failing to identify and correct conceptual difficulties in the literature's claims and assumptions; difficulties actually discussed later in the same study. It merely elaborated the *status quo* understanding of confidence building.

Since the original research was undertaken twelve years ago, there have been a number of opportunities for the author to re-examine some basic assumptions about what is central to the confidence building phenomenon. This re-examination has highlighted the need to distinguish sharply between confidence building *measures* and the confidence building *process* that gives meaning to the use of such measures. It has become clear in the intervening years that any formal attempt to explain confidence building *cannot focus directly on CBMs for they are not what need to be explained.* In fact, they are not "explainable" in any straightforward sense other than as artifacts or agents. CBMs are either the product or the agent (or perhaps both) of some form of process. It is the process that warrants explanation. Developing and then using the CBMs *causes* something to happen. It is the "something" and how it comes about that we want to understand, whether it is a narrower process associated with implementing CBMs or a more complex, associated transformation process.

Several years after the original study was completed, this realization led to the explicit construction of separate definitions for confidence building measures/agreements (in essence, what the measures "do") and the process of confidence building (what using the measures accomplishes in a broader sense). That, in turn, helped to refocus the author's analysis of confidence building, concentrating increasingly on process rather than

superficial procedure. The transformation view emerged gradually from the effort to refine the relationship between these two dimensions of confidence building.

Generic Analytic Flaws

Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective was not concerned solely with attempting to impose order on the professional literature of the day. Although a comprehensive distillation of basic ideas (in the form of the four perspectives outlined above) was a valuable way of portraying the conventional confidence building wisdom, some harsh conclusions regarding the central analytic shortcomings of that literature also seemed in order.

The original study identified two fundamental types of conceptual problem — "generic flaws" — as typical of the literature at that time. Summarizing the nature of those two generic analytic flaws, the study argued that the literature typically was characterized by:

(1)   Inadequate assessments of Soviet conventional military forces and the nature of the threat that they actually pose; and

(2)   Naive, simplistic or non-existent assumptions about the actual process of "Confidence-Building" and its psychological dynamics.[13]

In retrospect, the second flaw seems more important although that was not evident twelve years ago when the Soviet Union was seen to be a formidable foe in many estimates. At that time, the first problem was more striking. That there might be a close relationship between these two apparently very different types of analytic flaw did not emerge as a possibility for a number of years.

Inadequate Assessments

The original complaint about inadequate assessments of the seriousness of the Soviet military threat was valid. However, focusing on this aspect