Nevertheless, the Register provides an avenue through which to identify destabilizing trends in arms transfers.

Chalmers and Greene also report several of the Register's "teething" problems. First, most states missed the reporting deadline. Second, several states completed the standard reporting forms incorrectly. Third, the comparability of the data was poor. Fourth, there were differences in what constituted an arms transfer. Finally, there were inconsistencies in reports of exporters and importers for the same transfer.

Three suggestions are offered to improve the Register: first, promote wider participation; second, resolve inconsistencies and improve the reliability of its reports; and, finally, include data on military holdings and procurement through national production.

They conclude that the Register is off to a promising start. Its contribution to arms control in the future will depend on its development over the next few years. If successfully applied in conjunction with other arms control measures, the Register will have an important role to play as a confidence-building measure.

307. Corradini, Alessandro and Francesco Cottafavi. "Transparency in Armaments: A United Nations Perspective." In *Disarmament Topical Papers 15: Transparency in Armaments: The Mediterranean Region*, New York: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1993, pp. 72-81.

Corradini and Cottafavi chronicle the establishment of the "Transparency in Armaments" resolution (46/36L) in 1991, which established the UN Register of Conventional Arms. They also summarize the report of the 1992 Panel of Experts (General Assembly Document A/ 47/342), convened to establish an operating procedure for the Register. In addition, they detail General Assembly resolution 47/52L (15 December 1992) and note the objections to it (e.g. Egypt and Algeria objected to the fact that the Register did not include military holdings or procurement through national production). Moreover, the items before the 1992 Panel are discussed (e.g. expand the Register's existing categories by modifying their parameters). Furthermore, Corradini and Cottafavi examine the founding principles of a complimentary organization, the Disarmament Commission (e.g. "all states have the responsibility to provide objective information on military matters and the right of access to such information (p. 78)). They also relate the role of the Conference on Disarmament in modifying the Register (e.g. to debate how to include the transfer of high technology with military applications).

They conclude that the Register is an important confidence-building measure. Moreover, it has the potential to be an effective instrument of preventive diplomacy. In addition, Corradini and Cottafavi include five possible effects of the Register: first, it can provide an official indication of trends relating to the accumulation of conventional arms; second, it can promote openness (internationally and domestically) in conventional arms transfers; third, it can promote the creation or improvement of states' instruments to regulate the flow of arms; fourth, it can provide a framework for dialogue; and, finally, it can allow more focused attention on the issue of illicit arms transfers.