

As a confidence-building measure, however, such proposals have merit, but *only* if over time the states that accepted such a code:

- made public the rationale behind their transfers;
- behaved (reasonably) consistently over time;
- consulted with other participants prior to transfers;
- actually foreswore certain transfers as a consequence of adhering to the code of conduct;
- developed converging expectations that permitted them to harmonize their policies without recourse to formal treaties or definitional exercises.⁵³

What is particularly important to note is that "codes of conduct" are long-term measures that facilitate harmonization and reduce ambiguity, but that they are a poor substitute or foundation for more immediate formal or negotiated agreements and understandings that could involve verification or compliance monitoring. The definitional struggles that ensue over such concepts as "excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms" are detrimental to formal arms control negotiations, but they do form an essential part of regime building, and perhaps can lay the foundation for concrete initiatives in the longer-term, once a consensus on, for example, the meaning of "excessive and destabilizing" in a particular context has been reached. Thus as long as the long- and short-term goals are complementary, or not confused, the promotion of norms or principles concerning the proliferation of conventional arms can contribute positively to advancing the non-proliferation agenda.

Although this overview suggests that there are several measures that could be pursued to enhance the existing web of supply-side controls, it is unlikely that any of these measures by themselves would be sufficient to stem the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons. There are many reasons for this, but the most important would be that arms transfers are not simply "supply-push": the demand side of the equation is equally (if not more) important in determining the flow of weapons and military technologies. This strongly suggests that supply-side measures must be pursued in conjunction with some of the "mixed" measures discussed below, many of which represent a major departure from existing non-proliferation measures.

⁵³ This list of criteria is modelled on the classic requirements for constructing what International Relations scholars call a "regime," defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2.