

weapons other than nuclear and mass destruction weapons. It maintained that those other weapons not covered by the Outer Space Treaty are denominated in this proposal and currently they give rise to the deepest concern because they are the subject of research and development, with a view to being incorporated into strategic defence systems.

41. Some other delegations were not in favour of such approaches on the grounds that they did not give an accurate picture of all the threats confronting space objects and overlooked other significant factors of the military and strategic situation relevant to outer space. These delegations also held that proposals should be examined bearing in mind questions relating to compliance, verifiability, practicability and utility. One delegation held that it would be undesirable if proposed initiatives restricted the development of peaceful industry in space and that proposals therefore should be examined from this perspective as well.

42. One delegation suggested that States parties to multilateral treaties related to activities in outer space could make declarations recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all legal disputes concerning these agreements. In the view of that delegation such a declaration could be accompanied by a strong appeal to States not parties to these treaties to adhere to them as soon as possible.

43. Many delegations, noting that existing legal restraints whether bilateral or multilateral did not preclude the emergence of non-nuclear ASAT weapons, stressed the importance of a ban and limitations on anti-satellite weapons. Various delegations further elaborated previously advanced proposals. Thus, one delegation made an expert presentation and submitted a document (CD/927-CD/OS/WP.33) on basic provisions of a treaty on ASAT components and ways of verifying their prohibition, which contained comments on the problems of definitions and categorization of conventional ASAT weapons and indicated possibilities for effective verification of future agreements. The document also contained the following recommendations: advance notice of launch activities; on-site inspection of objects to be launched; prohibition of experiments, including collisions or explosions of space objects; no high velocity fly-by tests; observance of keep-out zones/minimum approach distances; advanced notice on manoeuvring activities of space objects; essentially improved registration and catalogue of space objects, including small debris and international exchange of data of space objects. Another delegation submitted another document entitled "Review of proposals and