

tion of the letter is its focus, not on *whether*, but on *how* to negotiate a comprehensive test ban.

Most recently, at the Vancouver Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should commence at an early date and that their governments would consult each other accordingly.

Of course, the situation, while promising, is not unequivocally so. Two nuclear-weapon states — the UK and China — have not declared nuclear testing moratoria. The US legislation foresees the possi-

the GSE to date. This remarkable group was formed in 1976 with a mandate to develop concepts for an international seismic data exchange system. The purpose of this system would be to assist the parties to a CTBT to monitor compliance by providing data for their own national verification purposes.

The GSE has held two international seismic data exchange experiments, in 1984 and in 1991, and has developed and refined a series of concepts that would form the backbone of a future international seismic verification network. In addition to the purely seismic aspects of the challenge, the Group has looked at such areas as communications procedures and the joint analysis of seismic data.

The GSE is now moving to implement the results of earlier studies. For example, one of its working groups is actually selecting the existing high quality seismographic stations that should be included in the global network, and is beginning site investigations in regions that will require new stations. Another working group is assessing the capabilities that will be achieved by various networks, so that the GSE will be able to provide some general cost-versus-capability options to the CD. Importantly, the GSE has established a target date of January 1, 1995 to have a sufficient global system implemented to begin full-scale testing.

Though it is generally recognized that a seismic exchange system would be the most important technical monitoring verification measure for a CTBT, other potential measures exist. For example, one could consider the following:

- a) "National Technical Means" of data collection, including aerial and space surveillance techniques. In this context, I would note that the first multilateral aerial surveillance agreement, the Open Skies Treaty, was signed last year. This practical, cost-effective regime puts aerial surveillance within the technical and financial grasp of many countries that could not otherwise have afforded it. At this time, four of the five nuclear-weapon states are covered by this Treaty.
- b) Other aspects of access to, and analysis of, remotely-sensed imagery as may be negotiated.
- c) Collection and analysis of atmospheric radionuclides, usually stated as a means

of monitoring venting from underground tests, but obviously useful for detecting atmospheric tests. Once again, I would note that the parties to the Open Skies Treaty have agreed that they will develop that regime for purposes of environmental monitoring.

- d) On-site inspections, with all of the protocols and allowed technical measurements that might be associated with the inspection teams.
- e) The overall financial and administrative aspects of the treaty, particularly the bureaucratic means of dealing with a suspected violation.

The GSE could take up these important topics, but a more direct way of accomplishing the objective would be to have the CD, or its Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc Committee, initiate discussions on the non-seismic aspects of CTBT verification. This step would serve to get the CD itself engaged in discussions over a concrete aspect of an eventual CTBT.

Another step we could take would be to have the CD urge the GSE to proceed with the installation and testing of the global seismic system. It seems to me that we have reached the stage where it is important to develop a real, rather than a hypothetical, system. Such a system would allow the GSE to gain experience with its real capability, and to present clear choices to the CD as to the projected costs, capabilities and types of network that would be most suitable.

It would also help the GSE to have an explicit acceptance by the CD of its target date of January 1, 1995, since by this date or sooner the GSE is going to require guidance from the CD on the type of system it wants pursued. The overriding point is that a decision on which verification system should be pursued can only be reached through negotiations. The sooner the negotiations proceed in earnest, the sooner the CD will be able to "overtake" the work of the GSE and begin to lead it.

Conclusion

We have now come to the point where the only way forward is to commence negotiations. Let us get on with the task. Let us ensure that we make the most of this singular opportunity to achieve an end to all nuclear test explosions in all environments for all time. To quote Ambassador Goodby in his earlier presentation to this conference, "Let us now be wise."

The focus is no longer on whether to negotiate a CTBT, but on how.

bility of a resumption of a limited number of tests for safety and reliability purposes only after July 1. Such a resumption by one nuclear-weapon state could lead to similar actions by the others. This would be particularly troubling in light of the fragile Arctic environment of Novaya Zemlya, the site of the last Soviet test...

With the successful conclusion of the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is now in a position to tackle another major subject and there is none more pressing than a CTBT. I might add, parenthetically, that the CD would be in an even stronger position to proceed were it to act decisively on the membership issue and open its doors to all UN Member States that wish to contribute to the negotiation of a global test ban treaty or any other multilateral disarmament issue.

Of course, the CD has undertaken extremely useful work on specific aspects of the nuclear test ban issue for many years. The Group of Scientific Experts (GSE), for example, has made important contributions to our understanding of the verification requirements of a test ban. But none of this can substitute for the negotiations themselves. The time is now ripe to move from the preparatory to the negotiating phase of our work.

Immediate Steps

What then, would be the most useful and practical steps that could be taken immediately in such negotiations? In the field of verification, I believe that we must build upon the considerable work done by