

pleasure theory, which must be decided by the life question, 'Which is true?' If incorrect, the danger is done away, etc." Now, if the charges be correct, the pleasure theory must fall to the ground, and be abandoned. How then can it happen that there is a drawn battle between Christianity and the theory, if the theory can no longer be maintained. The life question, "Which is true?" will have been already decided against the pleasure theory. On the other hand, if the objections be incorrect, it is asserted that there is no danger. So that the author evidently holds the opinion that Epicureanism is not incompatible with Christianity. In this belief we heartily concur. In his criticism of Egoism, the author is not so fortunate. He says:—"The theory being admittedly selfish, has, at least, the second of those defects before mentioned, which are charged by the hostile party." This, which is the sole objection raised against Egoism, is supposed utterly to crush that theory. But suppose selfishness to be shown not to be a defect, and we maintain that in the sense mentioned before it can be so shown, what hinders Egoism from being true? With regard to Altruism he says: "It seems impossible for a man who acknowledges only desire as a motive to really seek the pleasure of others by any other means than by pursuing his own." To us, indeed, an altruistic motive seems inconceivable, but at the same time it must be remembered that by reason of existing relations, and more especially because of the restrictions arising from powers of compulsion, it will often, and indeed generally, happen that one's own true and final happiness is identical with the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or rather the means to be taken in each case become identical. Still we maintain the true ulterior motive to be egoistic.

The next objection made, but not sustained, against the happiness theory is "that pleasure can be in no manner essentially connected with good, because it has a good, as opposed to a lofty character. The proposition that 'Pleasure is Good is rejected entire.' No one would ever think of maintaining that all pleasure is good, but we do maintain that true happiness is good. We cannot see that the truth of this is affected in any way by the fact that there are different grades of pleasure. The next sentence in the essay might easily have been omitted without detracting from the reputation of the author. 'We demur to levelling our noblest actions to so grovelling a field, being certain that moral feeling is sublimer than gratification.'

But the *pièce de resistance* of the whole is the author's theory of *Sub-conscious pleasure*. The name on the face of it looks suspicious, because it seems an impossibility for a person to feel happiness and not be conscious of it. Whoever heard of a person experiencing pleasure or pain unconsciously? And yet it is offered as an explanation of the moving force which leads the Utilitarian to set up the happiness of others, that there is a *sub-conscious* happiness reflected in him from theirs and made his, unknown to himself, by his automatic power of sympathy. The motive power is evidently admitted to be pleasure. But by whom is this pleasure experienced? Not by those for whom the action is performed, for the pleasure which they feel cannot move the person who performs the action and who did not feel the pleasure. He is moved not by this pleasure, but by a reflection of it through sympathy, which reflection is a sub-conscious pleasure.

That is to say, he is moved by a happiness which he does not experience, of which he is unconscious. It may be that what is intended to be conveyed is that pleasure is not thought of at the moment as the motive of good actions. But this does not alter the case at all, for on or in the future is the ulterior power which moves to action. The future pleasure, of course, being made present by the power of representation. We should have been glad had the writer been more explicit in defining the difference between reflected pleasure and any other pleasure, in so far as the person experiencing them is concerned. Although he seems to imagine that he is elaborating in this theory of reflected pleasure an objection sweepingly detrimental to the Egoistic theory, he is in reality but showing its truth, for after all he admits that the agent is moved by pleasure, that moves the agent, and this is what Egoism maintains. To object to the pleasure being taken as the motive because it happens to be reflected, is as silly as it would be for a messenger sent to buy a package of flour to refuse to take that offered because it was marked "Best Quality," and because the person who sent him did not happen to mention anything about it, except that it was flour which he was to get. The author has fallen into the mistake of first attacking the Egoistic theory and afterwards falling back upon it to explain the possibility of the Utilitarian theory which he maintains. He first of all affirms that good is "gloriously beyond pleasure," whatever he may mean by that, and afterwards explains the motive as due to *sub-conscious reflected pleasure*, an expression as unfathomable as the other. But though the pleasure moves him, says the writer, he does not think of it as in himself. Still the pleasure to be a pleasure must be felt, and it is felt by himself, nor is it any matter what each one may think his motives to be, we have to enquire what they really are. Again, it is stated that a true man would perish for the good of his race, even although he believed his own possibilities of happiness were doomed to everlasting extinction. This is a statement the truth of which we greatly doubt, and it is our lot to be acquainted with very many true men, who would do no such thing. And we believe that they have reason on their side. The threat of Christ that, "He that saveth

his life shall lose it, but he that loseth his life for my sake shall save it," refers, as will be at once seen, to this present world. In fact it cuts in a way exactly opposite to that intended by the writer of the pamphlet, for it distinctly holds out to those who undergo a little temporary trouble in this world for Christ's sake the hope of eternal happiness in the world to come. He does not ask such an unreasonable thing as that we should sacrifice ourselves for Him in this world, and receive as a reward in the world to come, eternal damnation. If He did, we are afraid the number of earthly saints would greatly diminish. Bacon writes: "We read that some of the elect and holy men, in an ecstasy of charity, and impatient desire of the good of communion, rather wished their names blotted out of the Book of Life than that their brethren should miss of salvation." But we should be careful to recollect that this unreasonable wish was made in an *ecstasy of impatient desire*. What men may wish in ecstasies is surely not to be taken as an argument in any calm, rational dispute. The main point then which this essay seems to have been intended to bring out will be found to depend on a solution of the difficulty with regard to the connection between the rightness of an action and the worth of the agent. It is needless to say that this problem has not been attempted, but the author, taking for granted that such and such things are true, comes, in company with Schopenhauer, to certain conclusions which seem to give him eminent satisfaction, and which we should also be obliged to concur in but that we happen to recollect the very doubtful character of the hypothesis upon which they are based.

On coming towards the end of the essay, we were rather dismayed upon reading that "by misconception much has been made, in our science, of the government, the behests, the Law, of Reason," but we were glad to find that the elaboration of the statement proved entirely harmless.

The subjects referred to in the closing part of the essay are much too extensive to be even touched upon in such a short sketch as this, but we are very much afraid that the beautiful dream which has been there drawn of the world developing into a state in which men will be forced and swayed sublimely and absorbingly into the pursuit of good, is as illusory as it is delightful in contemplation. We agree with the writer that morality depends to a great extent upon the truth of religion, but how far that dependence extends we are not going to discuss.

In conclusion, we join with the author in hoping that his sketch may be of use, and we congratulate him upon being able to devote some of his time during the every-day hurry of a life in this country, to the higher pursuit of philosophical studies.

EGOIST.

OUR FOOT-BALL MATCHES THIS SEASON.

When we entered upon the Foot-ball Season this year, we had lost six members of the old team, among them the Captain, Secretary, and Treasurer of the Club, all good players who had worked hard to bring the team into good condition and who found their efforts well rewarded by the record of the matches of the season of '81. We started this year with a good reputation and it was evident to all that we should have to play well to keep it up. After electing the officers of the Club, the next thing was to arrange the matches for the year. This was done satisfactorily by the Secretary, and the programme included matches with the other Montreal Clubs with the R. M. C. cadets, Toronto University and with Harvard.

NAMES OF THE TEAM.

The team this year consisted of the following Undergraduates.

Backs—H. Hamilton, '84, Sci. (Captain).

T. Haythorne, '84, Arts.

Half Backs—R. F. Smith, '83, Sci.

T. W. Robertson, '84, Arts.

Quarter Backs—W. L. Murray, '84, Sci.; F. Hague, '83, Law.

Forwards—J. H. Rogers, '84, Law; A. W. Smith, '85, Law.

G. C. Wright, '84, Arts; J. L. Hislop, '84, Sci.

J. Elder, '86, Med.

R. A. Kennedy, '84, Arts.

J. R. Unsworth, '84, Arts.

N. Worthington, '86, Med.

W. R. Shearer, '86, Sci.

Spare Men—C. M. Robertson, '85, Arts.

C. B. Smith, '84, Sci.

The finances of the Club were soon in a good condition, as there seemed to be quite a revival of interest in foot-ball among the students of all Faculties. This was due to the successful season of last year, and the energy of the officers of the Club, who spared no efforts to arouse in the Undergraduate a due appreciation of "Our University Game." I may also add that all the Montreal Clubs commenced their season with prospects as bright as our own. The Britannia holding the Championship Cup were pretty confident of retaining that trophy for another season. The Montreal Club had their team recruited by some of the best players from other clubs in Canada and England. Our first match was with the R. M. C. cadets and was played on Oct. 13th, on the McGill grounds. It was so fully reported in the Nov. issue of the *McGill Gazette* that it would be superfluous to give any detailed account of it. In this match which we won by a goal and a touchdown, it was seen that the