

(iii) to perform the functions the 8-power memorandum envisages for a permanent commission. (These functions are set forth in paragraphs four and five of the neutral memorandum of April 16 which provide that the scientific commission should process data received from the agreed system of observation posts, report on suspicious events, and receive all the facts necessary to establish the nature of such events which parties would be under an obligation to furnish. In the event the commission could not reach a conclusion on the nature of a significant event, the party concerned, in accordance with its obligation to provide the necessary clarification, "could invite" the commission to conduct an on-site inspection.)

4. The proposals of the UAR, Mexico and Brazil all endorse the Swedish suggestion outlined above. The Indian, Burmese, Ethiopian and Nigerian proposals, although less explicit on matters of detail also follow this general line. Mexico has expressed the view that "refusal to invite the scientific commission shall, *ipso facto* release the other party from obligations under the interim arrangement." The UAR has also stated that failure to invite the commission and to furnish it with a convincing explanation of such a failure would "free the states concerned from the heavy moral obligations undertaken by all parties." India has suggested that the two sides could agree on a small quota up to which invitations would be issued for the first year of the interim arrangement and that any state guilty of breaches of its obligations would "by such breaches free the other parties" from the agreement. If the view of the Mexican representative were accepted, the proposed interim arrangement would to all intents and purposes make on-site inspection, if requested by the commission, obligatory.

#### B. *Comparison of Neutral Proposals with Canadian Suggestion*

5. The Canadian paper is consistent with the Swedish proposal and those of the other non-aligned countries in its main outlines; it provides for a final cessation of tests in the three fallout environments and for the establishment of an interim ISC responsible for supervising an interim arrangement for the cessation of underground tests while a final comprehensive treaty was being negotiated. The three main differences between the Canadian paper and the non-aligned proposals are

- (1) our paper is not consistent with the 8-nation memorandum since it does not envisage as do all the neutral suggestions the processing by the interim ISC of all data received from a coordinated network of detection stations but only for the examination of doubtful events reported to the commission by parties to the agreement;
- (2) our paper makes specific suggestions regarding the composition of the interim ISC and also for voting procedures. In formulating their suggestions the neutrals have left these matters vague and there is obviously some advantage in not being too specific on such points at an early stage;
- (3) unlike the Indian suggestion, our paper does not include the idea of a quota system which would limit on-site inspections to a number which might possibly be acceptable to the Russians.

#### C. *Comments*

6. The neutral proposals which we have warmly supported have placed the Soviet Union in a very awkward position since they represent a clear challenge to state whether an interim arrangement is acceptable. So far the Russians have adopted a negative attitude but this has clearly irritated the non-aligned group since their proposals are entirely consistent with their memorandum of April 16 which the Soviet Union has repeatedly said it accepted as a basis for negotiation. It seems clear that the main reason for the negative Soviet position to these suggestions is that they tend to highlight the obligation of parties to give the interim ISC adequate assurances concerning the nature of a doubtful event, including the right to conduct