

*Private Members' Business*

The United States, as all will know, did not enter the war until December 1941. In that intervening period, however, there were agreements reached between the two countries on defence relations. During the Second World War, of course, there was intense co-operation between the two countries. Following the Second World War and with the rise of the perceived threat to North American security by the Soviet Union and its allies in eastern Europe, Canada entered into co-operative agreements with the United States under two main headings. The first was NATO, with the other western European countries, under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But for Canada in the mid-fifties, we reached a very specific agreement in respect of North American defence. This has always been seen as a subagreement under NATO, but in fact it is not necessarily under NATO. It stands on its own as an agreement between the United States and Canada.

Initially, the perceived threat to North American security was that of the U.S.S.R. attacking North America using manned bombers, carrying nuclear weapons and conventional bombs. As we got into the sixties and seventies, the nature of the threat changed to essentially a missile attack. This was not only from land-based missiles in the Soviet Union, interballistic missiles going from the Soviet Union to North America, but also sea-launched, sea-based missiles from submarines and other forms of attack on North America.

As the nature of the threat proceeded, the defence to that threat began changing. Initially there was the thought that we could put fighter planes up into the air to actually knock down the manned bombers coming into North America. But we fairly quickly got into missile defences against those who were attacking or perceived to be potentially attacking North America. But again, as we got into the sixties, seventies and eighties, it became very clear that there was no possibility whatever of defending against an attack in the sense of defeating an assault on North America. So the focus moved to surveillance, to knowing what was happening in the approaches to North American air space.

• (1120)

All of this has been predicated on the cold war and the proposition that the Soviet Union, which is the only country that had any capacity to attack North America in this way, might conceivably attack North America. We

should be prepared, primarily through deterrents to respond to such an attack.

What is now critical for this House and for our country to acknowledge is that the fundamental premise that has shaped NORAD and U.S.-Canada defence relations in respect of North America has completely and unalterably changed.

The premise that has changed is that the Soviet Union has any intention or any capacity to launch an attack on North America. I give you the words of the then Secretary of State for External Affairs on November 28, 1990 addressing a major international conference in Ottawa in which he said the following: "In region after region, on problem after problem, the Soviet Union now brings a welcome flexibility and assessments remarkably similar to Canada's. We see this at the CSCE, in the Pacific, in Cambodia, in Central America, in Angola, in South Africa, Afghanistan and the gulf. We see it in the fight against drugs, in the struggle against terrorism, in the pursuit of arms control. Disagreement with the Soviet Union was once the rule. It is now the exception. What disagreement does exist is often one of degree, not kind, and flows from national interest, not ideological intransigence or ambition. We are no longer enemies. We are no longer foes in a cold war one could win. We are friends. We are partners in building a structure of co-operative security and prosperity in which we all win".

These words were stated in November of 1990. Since then movement has been even more dramatic to underline the truth of the words spoken by the then Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Soviet Union is no longer a military threat to North America. It retains some marginal capacity. We deal with that problem, not by building expansive defence systems, but by negotiating down, through arms control and disarmament measures, the Soviet capacity to attack North America.

We build in controls that would flow in the break-up of the Soviet empire and we ensure that there is no attack. We also remember that we cannot protect ourselves against the outside possibility of a single madman in the Soviet Union sending missiles to North America or some accident triggering a launch of a missile. There is no possibility, scientifically or technologically, to protect ourselves against that by the kind of system that