

*Supply—External Affairs*

on Indo-China or any other part of Asia. Indeed, such proposals by prominent United States leaders for direct intervention have received severe criticism in the United Kingdom press. The London *Economist*, which many of us read from time to time, certainly cannot be regarded as an anti-United States paper. I would say that from time to time the *Economist* has warmly defended United States economic and external policies. In its issue of May 8, three weeks ago, the paper had this to say:

Even the majority leader of the Senate himself, Senator Knowland, is allowed to parade his irresponsibility daily, urging war with China and, when others hesitate to involve themselves in it, writing them off as unworthy allies. Is it surprising, with such goings on filling the press, that there should be a lack of confidence in the coherence, and even in the pacific intentions, of American diplomacy?

Then it sharply criticized the tactics of Mr. Dulles, and the *Economist* said this of his activities:

Bluff plays a proper part in diplomacy, if it is not tried too often and is never called. Unfortunately, too many of Mr. Dulles's bluffs have not worked. The "liberation" bluff, the "agonizing reappraisal" bluff, the "instant and massive retaliation" bluff—all these have been discovered to mean much less than they appeared to. The result has been to frighten America's allies much more than to impress the communists.

I fear, unfortunately, those words are true. I should like to say again that I am not criticizing the people of the United States, as a people, because I have every confidence that in the main the people of the United States share the desire for peace and a settlement that most of the rest of us have in mind.

Then, too, ill feeling has been engendered by the suggestion that if it were not for British timidity the United States would have approved the French request for air help before Dien Bien Phu fell. British opinion is doubtful if congress would have approved such action, and even if congress did it is doubtful if United States public opinion would have supported the action. I am going to quote again from the comment in the *Economist*:

In any case, one would have thought the merits of intervening at this precise moment of time and in a way that was much more likely to provoke Chinese counter-intervention than to save Dien Bien Phu were, to say the least, open to question.

I have devoted considerable attention to British opinion because they see, as we should do and I believe from the Prime Minister's statements earlier this session we see too, that such intervention as proposed in some United States circles would lead to an all-out Asian war and possibly to a world war. In any event, and I think this is something we

[Mr. Coldwell.]

always have to bear in mind in the commonwealth, in my opinion it would destroy once and for all that valuable association of India with Britain and the other countries in the commonwealth. I think we could say good-bye to India if that happened.

Articles by Hanson W. Baldwin, the well-known writer on international affairs, in the New York *Times* point out the dangers inherent in intervention. In various articles in the New York *Times* and particularly one which appeared last Sunday, May 23, he warns that the use of atomic weapons would be useless against the guerrilla forces of Ho Chi Minh, and would have the effect of consolidating much of southeast Asia psychologically, at least, against the United States. In summing up his views Mr. Baldwin wrote:

The limited advantages and considerable disadvantages—and the risks—of any course we may take in Indo-China were therefore enough to give Washington pause.

If I interpret the remarks of the minister of external affairs this afternoon correctly, and the remarks of the Prime Minister on an earlier occasion, we did not need to pause because we had not taken steps in that direction. I know that gives some satisfaction to many in this house and in the country.

Under these circumstances and with this background, it is obvious that the organization of collective security in southeast Asia presents an entirely different problem from the kind of regional collective security brought about by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I do not want to go into that, because the minister went into it. But I think that is perfectly correct; the two ideas are not analogous. They are quite different, and we should bear that in mind.

Walter Lippmann, whose articles many of us read in the *Montreal Gazette* every other day, elaborated this view in that newspaper on May 14 of this year. He suggested an alternative policy to strengthen the existing governments of Burma, Thailand and Indonesia, but with this very important proviso: Only if western co-operation is invited, not if it is forced upon them.

In other words, we believe that the initiative must come from Asia if we are going to have a security pact, a regional pact, within the United Nations, and particularly from India. That is essential if any united defence policy is to be approved by Canada, and as I hope by other western countries. And as I have already indicated, we think that any such pact should be a regional pact within the orbit of the United Nations charter and requested by Asian countries.

A few days ago I read a very interesting statement issued by the non-communist