

the position announced by the Prime Minister in 1975, when he noted that Canada would continue to seek to make available to developing countries the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, provided that adequate guarantees against the possible diversion of such co-operation to non-peaceful, explosive purposes were available. This is a position endorsed by other nuclear suppliers.

These agreements provide that identified nuclear exports, including nuclear technology in physical form, shall only be authorized on the basis of coverage by an intergovernmental guarantee: *First*, that the items supplied or items produced with these, including subsequent generations, will not be diverted to any non-peaceful or explosive purpose; *second*, that these guarantees are verified through inspection mechanisms of the International Atomic Energy Agency; *third*, that the retransfer of items supplied and items produced with these, including subsequent generations of nuclear material, only be done with the consent of the Government of Canada; *fourth*, that the enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear material supplied, or nuclear material produced with items supplied, only be done with the consent of the Government of Canada; *fifth*, that IAEA safeguards and other mechanisms of bilateral verification for aspects of guarantees, where the IAEA system is not applicable, be in place for the life of the supplied item or for items susceptible to these guarantees produced from these items; and, *sixth*, that adequate measures for the physical security of materials be in place to protect the supplied items from the threat of sub-national diversion.

The safeguards commitments, including the application of the International Atomic Energy Agency inspection system, undertaken by the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Argentina represent juridical assurances of a high order, which fully meet international standards and Canadian safeguards policy.

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