

Significantly, he did not suspend the nuclear test talks concurrently proceeding there, thus indicating an intention to reduce to a minimum East-West negotiations without eliminating them entirely.

The U.S.S.R. next turned its attention to the related problems of avoiding blame for what it had done and of dealing with the Chinese. It launched a massive propaganda attack against the United States, culminating in a meeting of the United Nations Security Council (July 22-26), where its representatives tried to have the United States proclaimed an aggressor, and in the elaborate trial of Francis Powers, pilot of the U-2 aircraft (August 17). These measures were designed to fix on the United States the blame for the summit failure. Similarly, although it was evident to everyone that the Soviet-bloc delegates had brought the disarmament negotiation to an end just as it was beginning to promise some progress, Mr. Khrushchov went to the United Nations General Assembly in September (taking with him the leaders of all but one of the other East European Communist parties) for the avowed purpose of denouncing the Western powers for obstructing disarmament, and of making proposals for a spring meeting of the General Assembly, at heads-of-government level, to discuss disarmament.

Thus, by mid-summer the Soviet Union had brought to an end for the time being its efforts to improve general relations with the West and to solve dangerous problems—efforts of which its Chinese allies so strongly disapproved. Significantly, however, it had not brought to an end the day-to-day East-West arrangements that had been developing, such as exchanges of visits, conclusion of trade agreements, improvement of consular relations, and so forth. For example, a Canadian-Soviet trade agreement signed on April 18, 1960, has functioned satisfactorily since then, and the visits of official delegations, as well as private persons, have continued between the two countries. There was good reason to think that the changed Soviet behaviour that characterized the period after May 16 was not to be a permanent feature of Soviet policy but was at least in part conditioned by the Chinese attitude.

Conference of Communist Parties

In Moscow, during November and December, representatives of every Communist party in the world except the Yugoslav met and for several weeks argued in secrecy the pros and cons of the Soviet and Chinese positions on how the world should be communized. Finally the meeting published a long statement, in some ways the most remarkable document to appear in the Communist world since Stalin's rise to power ended frank discussion of problems among Communists. The document discusses in detail every subject about which the two sides had contended, and it finds a form of words on each of these to which both Russians and Chinese were willing to agree. Yet despite the appearance of unanimity, there is nothing whatever in the document that commits either side in the dispute to changing its present policies. On the one hand the U.S.S.R. has not agreed to give up seeking improved relations with the West, to discontinue its support for certain anti-Communist regimes in the underdeveloped world, or to spread Communism by more militant means. On the other, the Chinese can find in the document ample support for their policy of hostility towards the United States and for their insistence on