

About signing the NPT there is much less ambiguity: according to their leaders, neither will do so. And both have said they will move from testing to weaponization. India, an original proponent of non-proliferation, will wait until there is universal and complete disarmament. Indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 is seen as hypocrisy and as a humiliating attempt to discriminate against India; it was another reason suggested for the alleged decision to go ahead with testing in that year, which was aborted under heavy US pressure, and the decision of the new BJP government to do what earlier governments would not. Pakistan takes a similar view, but more directly relates its position to the military situation it faces because of India.

The policy implications of the conceptual divide is clear. There is a need for a multi-track approach in South Asia. Pressure to join the global consensus on non-proliferation is today's primary emphasis; there is no need to accept the siren call of pseudo realism. There is also a need for sensible management of the new reality, of a nuclear South Asia.

PART ONE: THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

For the moment, then, it may be worthwhile to establish some of the basic parameters of that military situation. The debates and literature are all valid, but also somewhat to some degree beside the point. India and Pakistan have indeed entered a new era, a fact which seems little internalized at any level of debate.

At immediate issue is the security environment of the region. India inaugurated the current situation with its tests on May 11 and 13th, of this year. India cited a worsening security environment for its actions. After all prior governments refrained from testing since India's first nuclear explosion, in 1974, the newly elected BJP government last Spring said it was forced to go ahead because of the continued presence of nuclear weapons by China,