

In the Canadian view, any realistic and constructive assessment will need to take account of the following considerations, among others:

- Existing technologies cannot be disinvented, though their applications can be constrained in ways which enhance mutual security. (This is the central function of the existing arms control and disarmament process.)
- The boundary-line between military and non-military research cannot be clearly drawn, since many technologies can have both military and civilian applications.
- Militarily-relevant technological change cannot be halted or reversed but can be redirected by deliberate policy choices. Indeed, it is policy choices and intentions rather than the nature of the technologies themselves, which primarily determine the significance of weapons systems.
- While research under military auspices can produce results that have useful non-military applications, most experience suggests strongly that this is an inefficient way of obtaining non-military benefits (partly because security considerations impede the "migration" of research results to civilian applications). The disproportionate allocation of limited research resources to military-directed research can therefore involve the indirect cost of starving the civilian economy and society of badly-needed research resources.
- The unconstrained allocation of research resources to military purposes can contribute to an "arms race mentality" not only directly by accelerating the development of new weapons systems but also through reinforcing a perception of hostile intent.
- Finally, research under military auspices can contribute directly to the arms control and disarmament process through the development of technologies for the effective and economical verification of arms control agreements.

These factors suggest the desirability of ensuring more effective policy direction over the processes which will determine the kinds of weapons systems and defences which will become available in the future. A necessary first step in this area would involve greater openness and transparency in the area of military research. This special session could usefully consider the feasibility and potential utility of a reporting system within the framework of the United Nations whereby all States would be encouraged to file and make freely available information on their current and planned military research and development. The information could include an indication of the magnitude of that effort (expenditure, number of scientists involved) and its programme objectives. A potentially useful subcategory of these reports would be an indication of the research effort devoted to arms control verification. The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs would be a logical repository for such reports.