

## END NOTES

1. This is perhaps what most differentiates Japan from Germany in post-war dealings with former adversaries. For all the barbarism of the European war, the centuries old "habit of dialogue" among European peoples eased German re-integration into Europe.
2. Defence policy making in Japan is not the sole responsibility of the Japan Defence Agency; in effect it resides within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and - to a greater or lesser extent depending on the incumbent - in the Prime Minister's Office. The large number of secondments to the JDA from Foreign Affairs and Finance ensures these ministries a leading role in defence policy developments and initiatives (often well before the JDA has developed issues to the point where formal interdepartmental discussions are required).

At their inception, the Self Defence Forces (SDF) were objects of public and media antipathy - later apathy - for the stated reasons of their being in violation of Article IX of the Constitution. Most outside observers would agree that the real reason for this early antipathy was public resentment of Imperial forces' conduct in the years leading up to 1945, and their responsibility for the subsequent humiliation of surrender and occupation.

3. The Government's current interpretation of Article IX prohibits the provision of war materiel or support to other countries. However, under the Japan-United Nations Status of Forces Agreement, were the cease fire situation in Korea to deteriorate to such an extent that United Nations activities would be significantly increased, specific U.S. bases in Japan - designated as UN Command (Rear) bases - would be used to support United Nations peacekeeping operations in Korea.
4. Continued mainstream opposition in Japan to nuclear arms virtually rules out this option for the foreseeable future. The Japanese Supreme Court has declined to provide an authoritative interpretation of Article IX, preferring to leave the question to the legislative and administrative branches of the Government.
5. A product of the post-war policy of containment, the treaty has been interpreted to allow USFJ to be deployed elsewhere to enhance regional security (specified in Article Six, and most recently exercised when U.S. Marines based in Okinawa were deployed in support of Desert Shield and Desert Storm).
6. The physical presence of United States forces in Japan (USFJ) is impressive. There are 188 USFJ military installations of various sizes, seven of which are under the joint auspices of USFJ and United Nations Command (Rear), and approximately 54,000 USFJ personnel. Components of USFJ are: