

much more active Canadian role in arms control within NATO as long as we remain a member, and a more independent military posture in North America. His views need not be described in detail here because by no coincidence, I am sure, the NDP defence policy statement of April 1988 and the Johnson recommendations written in July 1987 are remarkably similar.

There are some irritating lapses in this book – the world really does have states proud to call themselves communist, not “so-called” communist – and some serious gaps in substance such as the absence of any serious consideration of the potential for international instability if radical disarmament steps are taken. But the book deserves to be read with care (and enjoyment) by every military officer, especially fliers, and all who are interested in issues of peace and security regardless of where they fit in the spectrum of attitudes.

General Johnson reveals himself as a deeply caring person and we can all share his desire for a better world and greater understanding. Many of us are more cautious and conservative in our beliefs about how to get there from here, but no one can responsibly deny that the author has contributed in a timely and useful way to the national debate about great issues of our time and Canada's part in them.

– John Toogood

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### **Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight**

Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass (eds.)

Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987, 380 pgs., US \$34.95 cloth, US \$14.95 paper

■ This book, by a Harvard research team, begins by positing a long list of common hypotheses about arms control, which are then “tested” against a series of seven case studies of actual arms control treaties or negotiations. In some ways, the book is a useful guide to the Soviet-American experience with arms control over the past couple of decades. It should, however, be emphasized

that coverage for the most part ends with the SALT II Treaty of 1979, thus missing both the early frustrations of Soviet-American negotiations under President Reagan and their more recent successes.

The case studies that are included – as well as several “cross-cutting analyses” of common themes – are generally informative, well-written, balanced in their judgments, and well-documented, being especially useful for those wishing to pursue the respective topics in greater detail on their own. Nevertheless, the study is strangely unsatisfying in the end. Perhaps the editors have bitten off more than they can chew. Evaluating no fewer than twenty-five hypotheses as applied to seven case studies, some of which extend over a number of years, may be too great a task for any single study. It is certainly too much to be adequately summarized in a conclusion of just twenty-seven pages.

The book is most useful in laying to rest a number of myths that have arisen in regard to arms control in recent years, particularly those propounded by the right-wing. Perhaps the best example is the alleged “lulling effect” of arms control, in inducing a false sense of security within the American public and causing it to neglect adequate defences. In virtually every case, the Harvard group found this not to be the case. In the years after SALT I, for example, polls showed the American public to be increasingly concerned about the Soviet “threat,” while support for defence spending remained constant for the first few years, before rising to new heights in the late 1970s.

The study does provide some support to left-wing critics who argue that arms control actually stimulates the arms race. However, it concludes that such stimulation is generally confined to specific programmes related to the negotiations or agreement, rather than affecting overall defence spending.

On other matters, the study concludes that arms control tends to succeed only where neither side has an “appreciable advantage,” and generally dismisses the view that unilateral restraint by one side

will induce reciprocal restraint by the other, or that gains in arms control lead to an improvement in overall relations between adversaries. Unfortunately, the study is not without the kind of truism that often afflicts social science, such as the observation that “militarily significant constraints on any particular category of weapons eludes negotiations if either side strongly prefers unfettered freedom of action with regard to the weapon in question.”

Strangely, while explaining in considerable detail how arms control to date has benefitted both the US and Soviet Union, and how the US has succeeded in largely avoiding the putative “lulling effects,” the editors judge that the evidence is “inadequate” to determine whether arms control has “serve[d] Soviet interests more than US interests.”

The most disturbing aspect of the book is to be found at the very end. Here the editors belittle the accomplishments of arms control, despite the evidence from the case studies themselves that those accomplishments have in fact been substantial. For example, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is derided for perhaps having “merely . . . codified the postponement of a race in defensive systems until advancing technologies made effective defenses possible” [emphasis added]. Even if the treaty does ultimately fall victim to advancing technology (by no means a sure thing) its contribution to strategic stability and to a dampening of expenditures on strategic arms in the meantime surely deserves greater recognition than this.

What is sorely lacking in the conclusion is an attempt at a sustained, balanced evaluation of arms control's accomplishments. Rather, we are offered a few, seemingly offhand comments that appear largely to denigrate the arms control enterprise, when the bulk of the book demonstrates, to this reader at least, that the enterprise has been immensely profitable in terms of enhancing international security. – Ronald G. Purver

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### **BRIEFLY NOTED**

#### **In the Eye of the Storm**

Fred Gaffen

Toronto: Duneau & Wayne, 1987, 302 pgs., \$24.95 cloth

This book is a welcome addition to the literature of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Not only is it the first to focus on the Canadian contribution across the forty-year history of modern peacekeeping, but it also provides a human dimension which complements existing analytical or theoretical studies. The book reads easily and is well supported by outline maps, index and bibliography.

Concise history is substantially supported by anecdotal and personal accounts which give a feel for both the satisfaction and frustration which accompany peacekeeping. The anecdotal format carries with it risks of error due to context, perspective and personal involvement. In this book the risk is justified because the individual contribution of the men and women of Canada's peacekeeping forces is well highlighted.

#### **Bibliography of Nuclear Age Educational Resources**

Prepared by the International Security and Arms Control Project of the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education

Stanford, CA: Leland Stanford Junior University Board of Trustees, 1987, 111 pgs., US \$8.95 paper.

■ This bibliography is a review of educational materials available in the field of international security education. Although most of the sources listed are American there is an obvious effort to maintain editorial and ideological balance in the selections. Listed and annotated are textbooks and curriculum materials, games and simulations, as well as other bibliographies and filmographies. The project which produced this book has as its aim, “improving the quality of precollegiate education about international conflict and security affairs.” □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in *Paix et Sécurité* 'Livres' section.