

urgent messages to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, to the Prime Minister of India and to President Eisenhower, suggesting that there be a positive and immediate response to the Khrushchev message". Such a response was in fact forthcoming. During the fortnight of negotiations which followed, Canada gave active encouragement to the efforts of the Western powers to ensure that the proposed conference would take place within a United Nations context, with suitable means of taking into account the views of the smaller powers, the procedure suggested being to have the private heads of government conference initiated by a full Security Council meeting. To this end, Canada formally associated itself on August 1 with a proposal made the same day by the United Kingdom Representative that a special Council meeting, to be attended by heads of government or other specially designated representatives, be held to discuss Middle East problems on August 12, if other members of the Council agreed; and the Canadian Prime Minister said he was ready to attend. He added, in a statement on July 31, "If Canada can make any contribution to the success of the proposed conference, and that includes the convening of the meeting of the security council at the summit, that contribution will be made willingly and with full confidence that it will have the approval of all those who are sincerely dedicated to the cause of peace." These plans were brought to naught, however, by Premier Khrushchev's call on August 5 for an emergency General Assembly meeting in place of the proposed conference. The Soviet leader argued that this original proposal for a five-power meeting had been obstructed by Western delay and nullified by the insistence that the conference be held within the Security Council, which, he said, was not in a position to solve the Middle East problem objectively.

Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly

The United States, and subsequently the Soviet Union, had already submitted draft resolutions to the Security Council for transferring the discussions to the General Assembly, but these had been left in abeyance since July 18. Now the Council speedily and unanimously passed, on August 7, a resolution for the summoning of an emergency special session of the Assembly, which met, as required, within twenty-four hours — i.e. on August 8. The Secretary-General himself set the keynote for the session on the opening day with what, in the Canadian view, was a helpful and able statement in which he drew the attention of the Assembly to the important truth that the key to the Middle East's problems lay largely in the hands of the states of the area — a fact that was substantially borne out by the developments of the session. President Eisenhower, in a major address to the Assembly on August 13, translated a number of the principles enunciated by the Secretary-General into positive proposals, and laid similar emphasis on the need to recognize the right of the people of the Arab nations to determine their own destinies. He also discussed measures which might be taken to assist the states of the area with respect to such issues as arms limitation and Arab economic development plans, and stated his belief that recent developments had demonstrated the need for a United Nations standby peace force.

The Soviet Union then submitted a resolution recommending the withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom forces from Lebanon and Jordan, instructing the Secretary-General to strengthen UNOGIL, and proposing the establishment of a similar observation group for Jordan, for the purpose of supervising the withdrawals. This resolution did not win the