

Incidentally M. Glotz mentions that the Greeks possessed a system of international arbitration.

Concluding, M. Glotz asserts that whenever the powers shall meet to draw up a new code of international law, they will find precedents from the Greeks, and even at this moment we can say with Plato: "It is not necessary to prolong the struggle beyond the moment when the wrongdoers shall be compelled by the innocent, weary of suffering, to give satisfaction": Plato, Republic, V., s. 16.

We may well assume that Plato's injunction will be carried out when Germany sues for peace. But it is equally sure that the struggle will be prolonged until the time arrives when the great principles for which the allies are contending has been fully vindicated.

LIABILITY FOR SPREAD OF FIRE.

How far is a man who lights a fire on his own land liable for damage done by the fire spreading to his neighbour's land? It appears not to be settled whether the neighbour can recover damages against the lighter of the fire in the absence of some degree of negligence in the latter. One way of stating the question would be: Is the liability to the injured neighbour an absolute one and within the rule of *Rylands v. Fletcher* (1868), L.R. 1 Exch. 265, 3 H.L. 330, or does it depend on proof or presumption of negligence?

The principle of *Rylands v. Fletcher* is thus stated in the words of Blackburn, J.: "The person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is *prima facie* answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." *Rylands v. Fletcher* had to do with water and the damage done by its escape from a reservoir, and Blackburn, J., gave as instances of the application of the above rule the damage done by escaping cattle, by the influx of filth into a cellar, and by the diffu-