may be noticed, viz., that so long as Parliament had passed no general law dealing with the subject, the field was open to the Legislature to supply the want of one as nearly as might be. Pushed to its legitimate conclusion, this argument implies that the Legislature of each Province may pass a local bankrupt or insolvent Act; but it is met and answered by the observation of the Privy Council in *Lambe* v. *Bank of Toronto*, (*f*), not indeed for the first time made there, that the Federation Act exhausts the whole range of legislative power, and that what is not thereby given to the Provincial Legislatures rests with the Parliament."

We have here that distribution of legislative power which, as Crease, J., says in the *Thrasher case* (1882), (*g*), "may one day, though in the perhaps distant future, expand into national life." He tells us, in the same case (*ib.*, at p. 199), that he has from the first examination into the Act regarded sec. 91 of the B.N.A. Act "as the legal keystone of Confederation, without which the whole fabric, built up with such exceeding care, would infallibly tumble to pieces from absolute lack of power of cohesion." And, again (*ib.*, at p. 200), this section, he says, appears to him "to contain the legal germ of development of the Union in the future clearly shadowed forth in the early speeches of Sir John Macdonald." And (*ib.*, at p. 202) he cites words of Lord Carnarvon in introducing the Act into the House of Lords, in reference, as he says, to this 91st section: "In this is, I think, comprised the main theory and constitution of Federal Government; on this depends the practical working of the new system. The real object which we have in view is to give to the central Government those high functions and almost sovereign power by which general principles and uniformity of legislation may be secured in those questions of common import to all the Provinces; and at the same time to retain for each Province so ample a measure of municipal liberty and self-government as will allow, and indeed compel, them to exercise those local powers which they can exercise with great advantage to the community." But the subsequent Privy Council decision of *Bank of Toronto* v. *Lambe* (1887), (*h*), seems to very clearly show that the learned judge goes too far in saying, as he does (at p. 199), that "the very groundwork and pith of the constitution is that the Dominion is Dominus." At all events, the Dominion Government or Parliament can in no sense be called "Dominus," except so far as the possession of the veto power can be said to make them so. In the face of *Bank of Toronto* v. *Lambe*, it is impossible any longer to say, as Crease, J., says in the *Thrasher case* (*i*), that the Local Legislatures have to exercise their legislative powers "so that they shall not interfere with the general legislation in similar or on the same matters under the exclusive powers expressed or necessarily implied as belonging to the Dominion under sec. 91," notwithstanding that he adds a little further on that "on this very point of supremacy of the Dominion, where Federal and Provincial laws conflict, and even sometimes where they may

(*f*) 12 App. Cas. 588.
(*g*) 1 Brit. Col. at p. 195.
(*h*) 12 App. Cas. 588.
(*i*) 1 Brit. Col. at p. 200.