example, during the Mulroney government academics and media have helped the government transcend the initial cold war simplicities and pro-American sentiments displayed in *Competitiveness and Security*, helped Canada become one of the few major countries to renounce government-to-government participation in the US Strategic Defence Initiative, inspired Canadians to rebel against the presence of an American Coast Guard icebreaker in Canada's Arctic waters, and sustained the government's desire to be in the vanguard of the struggle against institutionalized racism in South Africa. It is enough to make the real realists in the White House grit their teeth in disgust.

## Four key professors in government

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rs ly Perhaps the essential character of the scholars' contribution to the prevailing premises of Canadian foreign policy practice can best be assessed by focusing on the contribution of the four professors (apart from Professors Pearson and Trudeau themselves) who served long enough, in sufficiently lofty positions in government, to make a discernable difference to the concepts and conduct of Canadian foreign policy. Of the four — Professors Skelton, Watkins, Head and Hockin — none was a realist, either before or during his government service. The most American of the group in background, worldview and policy prescription — O.D. Skelton — served as Undersecretary of State for External Affairs in the 1930s when North American "exceptionalism," with its firm roots in Wilsonian idealism and Rooseveltian isolationism, were the domi-

nant doctrines on the continent. Mel Watkins, an economist who helped develop the field of Canadian political economy, became a leading nationalist intellectual for a brief period in the late 1960s and headed a government task force which worried about US direct foreign investment in Canada. Ivan Head, who spent seventeen years at Pierre Trudeau's side, used his substantial influence to expound positions that were certainly different from, and often directly opposed to, US foreign policies in the world. And most recently Tom Hockin, who co-authored the parliamentary foreign policy review, Independence and Internationalism, has as his major contribution the anti-realist concepts, of the federalist style and voluntarist tradition in Canadian foreign policy, and the management of a mechanism whereby a novice Prime Minister could acquaint himself with the deeply embedded views of the Canadian public on their relationship with the outside world.

It is noteworthy that, in practice, all four of these professors-in-government were ultimately more the creatures than the conceptual creators or even the consciences of the politicians they served. It was Mackenzie King who brought Skelton to Ottawa because he liked the way the professor articulated King's own views. It was Walter Gordon who began the nationalist revolution in 1956 and hired Mel Watkins a decade later, to lend intellectual ballast to the nationalist cause. It was Pierre Trudeau who took Ivan Head into the PMO, allowed him to assume a steadily increasing foreign policy dossier, and used him to articulate for anglophones the sentiments the Prime Minister shared



No room at the table