of the governed. With Aristotle he held that it came into existence for the sake of life, its abiding purpose was the good life—the life of science, art, religion.

In opposition to all this Treitschke fiercely announces:

The State is in the first instance power. It is not the totality of the people itself, as Hegel assumed. On principle it does not ask how the people is disposed; it demands obedience.

The State is no academy of arts; if it neglects its power in favour of the ideal strivings of mankind it renounces its nature and goes to ruin. The renunciation of its own power is for the State in the most real sense the sin against the Holy Ghost.

If art is incompatible with politics, religion is its sworn enemy. It starts from an opposite principle: 'Religion wishes to know only what it believes; the State to believe only what it knows.' So of the form of union required by each. 'The ideal of a religious fellowship is there public. But as the State is in the first instance power, its ideal is undoubtedly the monarchy, because in it the power of the State expresses itself in an especially decided and consistent way.' True—real monarchs are becoming scarce, even in Germany. 'Prussia alone has still a real monarch who is entirely independent of any higher power,' and who is prepared to say with Gustavus Adolphus, 'I recognize no one above me but God and the sword of the victor.' But that can be remedied by extending the benefits of the Prussian

¹ This I take to be a parody of Hegel's statement 'The State is that which knows', op. cit., § 270, n. Hegel's own view is condensed in the sentence: 'Since ethical and political principles pass over into the realm of religion and not only are established but must be established in reference to religion, the State is thus furnished with religious confirmation.'

² op. cit., iii, § 17.

³ Ibid., i, § 1.