

be true, against the Evidence of common Sense, will it be said that *these Troops are the most properly plac'd for this Purpose in case of Need*? Can We suppose that the *Landgrave of Hesse* would leave his own Dominions in a defenceless Condition, in case of any sudden Attempt from the *Vienna Allies*, and march immediately to the Assistance of *Holland*?—Or, even supposing Him so honourably regardless of his own Safety, as to run any Hazards in the Execution of his Engagements; might not the March of these Troops into *Holland* be attended with many more *Accidents, Difficulties and Delays*, than the Transportation of Succours from *England*?

But there is another Consideration, which renders this Argument still more ridiculous. The *Considerer* seems to allude to the Case of *Embsden*, when He speaks of our Obligations to support *Holland* against the Attacks of the King of *Prussia*; whereas the Troops of *Hesse Cassel* can never be employ'd to assist the *Dutch* to protect *that Place* against the Execution of a Decree of the *Aulick Council*. It appears from the Papers in *Roussset*, (*Tom. 4.*) that the *States of Holland* don't pretend to dispute the Authority of that *Court of Justice*. They only solicited the Court of *Vienna* to suspend the Execution of that Decree, in hopes that Matters might be amicably made up between the Prince and the *States of East Friesland*. They exhorted the Prince to desist from the Rigour of *that Decree* in his Favour, and say that They are interested in the Consequence of the Execution of it, as it may be the Expulsion of their Garrison, which They have kept there 120 Years, to secure the Observation of Conventions between the Prince and *States of East Friesland*. They say likewise that the Money lent by their
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