

to extradition than in countries separated by great natural barriers, rendering inter-communication difficult. Some offences might reasonably form the subject of extradition in the one case, that could not properly do so in the other, but debt or civil liabilities of any kind could not be so included. The duty of extradition was a surrender, in some degree, of the territorial rights of a Sovereign State, and was only submitted to in the interests of humanity and good government. Those interests demand that crime should not escape punishment, and that the criminal wherever found should be delivered up to justice. The principle of English jurisprudence was that the administration of criminal law was absolutely local—that crime must be tried by the law of the place at which it was committed. There were, perhaps, one or two exceptions to the general rule, such as crime committed on board of ships. This principle was founded on reason and justice, as the criminal should only be made amenable to the laws he was charged with having violated. Hence the necessity of extradition for crime. But it could not be said that the interests of humanity, or the welfare of nations, required the application of the same rule to civil liabilities. Both England and the United States offered the protection of their laws to every man untainted with crime that choose to live under them, and neither, he was sure, would consent to any interference with that protection on grounds of a civil or political character. An unfortunate debtor seeking a home in either country would always do so with safety. But if it were possible to extend the law of extradition to debtors, he (Mr. Miller) contended that it would be inexpedient and unnecessary to do so. The civil process of our own Courts easily secured the property of an absconding debtor within their jurisdiction, and the courts of the United States were open to a creditor wherever the absconder could be found. This was the great distinction between civil and criminal cases. (Hear, hear.) Extradition would be a much more tedious and expensive process than the remedy the courts of both countries already afforded. Then, he (Mr. Miller) would like to know how the extradition of debtors was to be effected? Would the same steps be necessary that were now followed in procuring the surrender of fugitive criminals? At present a private individual could make no claim for extradition against any one; the demand must be made by the Government of either country, and, before suc-

cessful, receive the sanction of that of the other. Could any other course be adopted in civil cases? Would the hon. member, then, make the Government of Canada or the United States an agent or attorney for the collection of the claims of private individuals against absent or absconding debtors? It was too absurd to suppose that the civil process of either country would be allowed to run into the territory of its neighbor. If the proposition of the hon. gentleman became law it would be attended with endless vexation and difficulties, but of that he had not the slightest apprehension. He considered it his duty, however, to make these remarks, lest through inadvertence the motion might receive the assent of the House. He thought his hon. friend had better have leave to withdraw his motion. (Hear, hear.)

Hon. Mr. DICKEY said that he had seconded his friend's motion for the purpose of having it discussed, but at the same time he thought it right that he should guard himself from any sympathy with the object of the motion. He could not look at it in any other light than as a motion for changing the international law, and as such he thought it was unnecessary, because you could follow a man anywhere for debt. It was quite true that there were difficulties in the way, but the same difficulties would always present themselves, no matter how far the Extradition Law was extended. For instance, if a man claimed that an absconding debtor owed him a certain sum, he would have to establish his claim in a United States court before he could ask for the exercise of any extradition law in his favor. Now, as an illustration, in Nova Scotia they did not allow an arrest for debt unless it could be shown that the man was going to leave the country; if, therefore, the man left Nova Scotia and went to the United States, and he was followed there and brought back he would be imprisoned for what he could not have been imprisoned for if he had remained at home. He (Hon. Mr. Dickey) could fancy that was such a treaty in existence it would do no good. If a person committed a political offence he could not be followed into another country, because any other country having regard to her independence and self-respect would not submit to such interference. Suppose there was a Fenian raid, or an expression of Southern sympathy on the part of any number of persons and a demand should be made that they were to be brought back into the